传习录

答顾东桥书

130

来书云:「近时学者务外遗内,博而寡要。故先生特倡『诚意』一义,针砭膏育,诚大惠也。」

吾子洞见时弊如此矣。亦将何以救之乎?然则鄙人之心,吾子固已一句道尽,复何言哉?复何言哉?若「诚意」之说,自是圣门教人用功第一义。但近世学者乃作第二义看,故稍与提掇紧要出来,非鄙人所能特倡也。

来信说:「近来的学者务外遗内,博学而不得要领。所以先生特别提倡『诚意』这一要义,针砭积弊,真是莫大的恩惠。」

您对时弊看得如此透彻,那么又打算怎样救治呢?既然如此,我的心,您已经一句话道尽,还有什么可说的呢?还有什么可说的呢?至于「诚意」之说,本来就是圣门教人用功的第一要义。只是近世学者把它当作第二义看待,所以我稍稍把紧要处提掇出来,并非我所能特别提倡的。

Your letter says: 'Scholars today pursue the outward and lose the inward, broad but without essentials. Hence you specially champion sincerity of intention, needling the deep-seated illness — a great boon indeed.'

You see the sickness of the age so clearly — how then would you cure it? As it is, my heart you have already summed up in one phrase: what more is there to say? What more? As for sincerity of intention, it has from the first been the first principle of the sages' teaching. Only because recent scholars treat it as second did I lift out what is essential — not something I could specially champion.

131

来书云:「但恐立说太高,用功太捷;后生师傅,影响谬误;未免坠于佛氏明心见性、定慧顿悟之机。无怪闻者见疑。」

区区格、致、诚、正之说,是就学者本心、日用事为间。体究践履,实地用功,是多少次第、多少积累在?正与空虚顿悟之说相反。闻者本无求为圣人之志,又未尝讲究其详;遂以见疑,亦无足怪。若吾子之高明,自当一语之下便了然矣。乃亦谓「立说太高,用功太捷」,何邪?

来信说:「只恐立论太高,用功太快捷,后生们辗转师传,误会谬误,未免堕入佛家明心见性、定慧顿悟的套路。难怪听的人起疑。」

我的格物、致知、诚意、正心之说,是就学者的本心、日常应事接物之间讲的。体究践履、在实处用功,其中有多少次第、多少积累!正与空虚顿悟之说相反。听的人本来没有做圣人的志向,又不曾细究其详,因此见疑,也不足怪。像您这样高明的人,本该一句话之下便了然,却也说「立论太高、用功太捷」,为什么呢?

Your letter says: 'I only fear the doctrine is set too high and the work too swift; young students, learning through intermediaries, may slip into the Buddhists' shortcut of illuminating the mind, seeing one's nature, sudden awakening. No wonder hearers doubt.'

My teaching of investigating things, extending knowledge, sincerity and rectification addresses the learner's own mind amid daily affairs. Investigating and practicing, working on solid ground — how many stages, how much accumulation are there in it! It is the direct opposite of empty sudden awakening. Hearers who have no resolve to become sages and have never examined it in detail doubt it — no wonder. But one of your penetration should see at a single word; yet you too say the doctrine is too high, the work too swift — why?

132

来书云:「所喻知行并进,不宜分别前后。即《中庸》『尊德性而道问学』之功,交养互发、内外本末一以贯之之道。然工夫次第,不能无先后之差。如知食乃食,知汤乃饮,知衣乃服,知路乃行,未有不见是物,先有是事。此亦毫厘倏忽之间,非谓截然有等,今日知之而明日乃行也。」

既云「交养互发、内外本末一以贯之」,则知行并进之说无复可疑矣。又云:「工夫次第,不能不[1]无先后之差。」无乃自相矛盾已乎?「知食乃食」等说,此尤明白易见,但吾子为近闻[2]障蔽,自不察耳。夫人必有欲食之心,然后知食;欲食之心即是意、即是行之始矣。食味之美恶,必待入口而后知。岂有不待入口而已先知食味之美恶者邪?必有欲行之心,然后知路;欲行之心即是意、即是行之始矣;路岐之险夷,必待身亲履历而后知。岂有不待身亲履历,而已先知路岐之险夷者耶?「知汤乃饮」,「知衣乃服」,以此例之,皆无可疑。若如吾子之喻,是乃所谓不见是物而先有是事者矣。吾子又谓:「此亦毫厘倏忽之间,非谓截然有等今日知之,而明日乃行也。」是亦察之尚有未精。然就如吾子之说,则知行之为合一并进[3],亦自断无可疑矣。

来信说:「您说知行并进,不宜分出先后。也就是《中庸》『尊德性而道问学』的功夫,交相涵养、互相引发、内外本末一以贯之之道。然而功夫的次第,不能没有先后的差别。如知道食物才吃、知道汤才饮、知道衣服才穿、知道路才走,没有不见到那东西、先有那事情的。这也只在毫厘倏忽之间,并不是截然分等、今天知道明天才去做。」

既然说「交养互发、内外本末一以贯之」,那么知行并进之说就无可疑了。又说「功夫次第,不能没有先后的差别」,岂不是自相矛盾吗?「知食乃食」等说法尤其明白易见,只是您被近来的闻见障蔽,自己不察觉罢了。人必定先有想吃的心,然后才知道食物;想吃的心就是意,就是行的开始了。食物味道的好坏,必须等入口之后才知道,哪有不待入口就已先知道味道好坏的?必定先有想走的心,然后才知道路;想走的心就是意,就是行的开始了;道路的险夷,必须亲自经历才知道,哪有不亲身经历就已先知道路途险夷的?「知汤乃饮」「知衣乃服」,照此类推,都无可疑。若照您的比喻,那才是所谓不见其物而先有其事了。您又说「这也只在毫厘倏忽之间,并不是截然分等、今天知道明天才行」,这也是省察得还不够精。然而照您的说法,知行的合一并进,也自然断然无可疑了。

Your letter says: 'You hold knowledge and action advance together without before or after — as the Mean says, honoring the moral nature while pursuing inquiry, mutually nourishing, inner and outer, root and branch one thread through. Yet the order of work cannot lack sequence: knowing food, one eats; knowing the soup, drinks; knowing clothes, dresses; knowing the road, walks — never the deed before the thing is seen. This is a hairspread-in-an-instant, not a hard division of knowing today and acting tomorrow.'

Having granted mutual nourishment and one thread through inner and outer, root and branch, the advance-together of knowledge and action needs no further defense. To add that the order of work cannot lack before-and-after — is that not contradicting yourself? The examples of eating and the rest are the plainest of all; only your recent habits veil them from you. One must first have the desire to eat, and then knows food; the desire to eat is intention, is already the beginning of action. Whether the food is good or ill is known only after it enters the mouth — who knows it before? One must first will to travel, then knows the road; the will to travel is intention, the beginning of action; the road's dangers are known only by treading it oneself. Soup and clothing follow the same rule. On your own figure, it would be the deed before the thing seen. Your further remark — that it is only a hairspread in an instant, not know today and act tomorrow — still wants fineness. Yet even on your terms, the union and advance of knowledge and action admit no doubt.

  1. 据来书,原文「不」字显系误印。施本、张本无「不」字。
  2. 「近闻」指朱熹为主的知先行后说。
  3. 王守仁此处「合一并进」即合一之义。「并进」二字系未经详细斟酌所用语。
133

来书云:「真知即所以为行,不行不足谓之知,此为学者吃紧立教,俾务躬行则可。若真谓行即是知,恐其专求本心,遂遗物理,必有暗而不达之处。抑岂圣门知、行并进之成法哉?」

知之真切笃实处即是行,行之明觉精察处即是知[1],知、行工夫本不可离。只为后世学者分作两截用功,失却知、行本体,故有合一并进之说。「真知即所以为行,不行不足谓之知」,即如来书所云「知食乃食」等说可见,前已略言之矣。此虽吃紧救弊而发,然知、行之体本来如是,非以己意抑扬其间,姑为是说,以苟一时之效者也。

「专求本心,遂遗物理」,此盖失其本心者也。夫物理不外于吾心,外吾心而求物理,无物理矣;遗物理而求吾心,吾心又何物邪?心之体,性也,性即理也。故有孝亲之心,即有孝之理,无孝亲之心,即无孝之理矣;有忠君之心,即有忠之理,无忠君之心,即无忠之理矣。理岂外于吾心邪?晦庵谓:「人之所以为学者,心与理而已。心虽主乎一身,而实管乎天下之理;理虽散在万事,而实不外乎一人之心。」是其一分一合之间,而未免已启学者心、理为二之弊。此后世所以有「专求本心,遂遗物理」之患,正由不知心即理耳。夫外心以求物理,是以有暗而不达之处,此告子义外之说,孟子所以谓之不知义也。心一而已,以其全体恻怛而言,谓之仁;以其得宜而言,谓之义;以其条理而言,谓之理。不可外心以求仁,不可外心以求义,独可外心以求理乎?外心以求理,此知、行之所以二也。求理于吾心,此圣门知、行合一之教,吾子又何疑乎?

来信说:「真知就是用来行的,不行就不足以称为知,这对学者是切要的教法,使人务于躬行是可以的。若真的说行就是知,恐怕人们专求本心,便遗漏了事物之理,必有晦暗不通之处。这难道也是圣门知行并进的成法吗?」

知得真切笃实处就是行,行得明觉精察处就是知。知行的功夫本不可分离,只因后世学者分作两截用功,失掉了知行的本体,所以才有合一并进之说。「真知即所以为行,不行不足谓之知」,照来信「知食乃食」等说法即可看出,前面已大略说过了。这虽是为切要救弊而发,然而知行的本体本来就是这样,并非以己意抑扬其间、勉强立说以苟求一时之效。

「专求本心,遂遗物理」,这是失去了本心的人才有的说法。事物之理不外于我心,离开我心去求事物之理,就没有物理了;抛开物理去求我心,我心又是什么东西呢?心之体是性,性就是理。所以有孝亲之心,就有孝之理;没有孝亲之心,就没有孝之理。有忠君之心,就有忠之理;没有忠君之心,就没有忠之理。理难道在我心之外吗?晦庵说:「人之所以为学,心与理而已。心虽主于一身,而实管乎天下之理;理虽散在万事,而实不外乎一人之心。」在他这一分一合之间,未免已开了学者把心理分作二物的弊端。后世之所以有「专求本心,遂遗物理」的祸患,正由于不知道心就是理。离开心去求物理,所以有晦暗不通之处,这正是告子「义外」之说,孟子所以说他不知义。心只是一个:就其全体恻怛而言叫作仁,就其处置得宜而言叫作义,就其条理而言叫作理。不可离开心去求仁,不可离开心去求义,偏偏可以离开心去求理吗?离开心去求理,这就是知行分作二事的原因。在我心中求理,这才是圣门知行合一之教,您还有什么可疑的呢?

Your letter says: 'That true knowledge is for action, and without action knowledge does not count, is urgent teaching spurring learners to practice — well and good. But to say action itself is knowledge may drive men to seek the mind alone and neglect the principles of things, with dark places they cannot reach. Is that the established method of the school, knowledge and action advancing together?'

Knowledge at its most genuine and solid is action; action at its lucid and discerning is knowledge. The two works were never to be parted; only because later scholars split them in two and so lost the original substance of knowledge and action did the teaching of union and joint advance arise. That true knowledge is for action your own examples of eating show, as touched on before — a remedy urgently raised, yet the substance of knowledge and action was always thus, not my private tilt framed for passing effect.

'Seeking the mind alone, neglecting principles' is the speech of one who has lost his original mind. The principles of things are not outside my mind: outside the mind to seek them, there are none; dismissing them to seek the mind, what would the mind be? The mind's substance is nature, and nature is principle. With a filial heart there is the principle of filial piety; without the filial heart, no such principle. With a loyal heart, the principle of loyalty; without it, none. Is principle outside my mind? Zhu Xi said: learning is mind and principle; the mind, though master of one body, truly commands the world's principles; the principles, though scattered in the myriad affairs, truly do not lie outside one man's mind. In that one sundering and one joining he already opened the defect of making mind and principle two. Hence the later plague of 'seeking the mind alone, neglecting principles' — precisely from not knowing the mind is principle. Seeking principle outside the mind, dark impasses arise — Gaozi's 'rightness is external', which Mencius condemned as not knowing rightness. The mind is one: as wholehearted compassion it is called humaneness; as fitting measure, rightness; as ordered pattern, principle. One may not seek humaneness outside the mind, nor rightness — yet principle alone may be? Seeking principle outside the mind is why knowledge and action became two. Seeking principle in my mind is the school's teaching of their unity — what doubt remains for you?

  1. 此不见于《传习录上》,系晚年对知行合一说的深入阐发。
134

来书云:「所释《大学》古本,谓致其本体之知,此固孟子『尽心』之旨,朱子亦以虚灵知觉为此心之量。然『尽心』由于『知性』,『致知』在于『格物』。」

「尽心由于知性,致知在于格物」,此语然矣。然而推本吾子之意,则其所以为是语者,尚有未明也。朱子以「尽心、知性、知天」为「物格、知致」,以「存心、养性、事天」为「诚意、正心、修身」,以「殀寿不贰、修身以俟」[1]为「知至仁尽、圣人之事」。若鄙人之见,则与朱子正相反矣。夫「尽心、知性、知天」者,生知、安行,圣人之事也;「存心、养性、事天」者,学知、利行,贤人之事也;「殀寿不贰,修身以俟」者,困知、勉行,学者之事也。岂可专以「尽心、知性」为知,「存心、养性」为行乎?吾子骤闻此言,必又以为大骇矣。然其间实无可疑者,一为吾子言之。

夫心之体,性也;性之原,天也。能尽其心,是能尽其性矣。《中庸》云:「惟天下至诚为能尽其性。」又云:「知天地之化育,质诸鬼神而无疑,知天也。」此惟圣人而后能然。故曰:「此生知、安行,圣人之事也。」

存其心者,未能尽其心者也,故须加存之之功;必存之既久,不待于存而自无不存,然后可以进而言尽。盖「知天」之「知」,如「知州」、「知县」之「知」,「知州」则一州之事皆己事也,「知县」则一县之事皆己事也,是与天为一者也;「事天」则如子之事父,臣之事君,犹与天为二也。天之所以命于我者,心也,性也,吾但存之而不敢失,养之而不敢害,如「父母全而生之,子全而归之」者也。故曰:「此学知、利行,贤人之事也。」

至于「殀寿不贰」,则与存其心者又有间矣。存其心者虽未能尽其心,固已一心于为善,时有不存,则存之而已;今使之「殀寿不贰」,是犹以殀寿贰其心者也;犹以殀寿贰其心,是其为善之心犹未能一也;存之尚有所未可,而何尽之可云乎?今且使之不以殀寿贰其为善之心,若曰「死生殀寿,皆有定命」,吾但一心于为善,修吾之身以俟天命而已,是其平日尚未知有天命也。「事天」虽与天为二,然已真知天命之所在,但惟恭敬奉承之而已耳;若「俟之」云者,则尚未能真知天命之所在,犹有所俟者也,故曰「所以立命」。立者「创立」之「立」,如「立德」、「立言」、「立功」、「立名」之类。凡言立者,皆是昔未尝有而今始建立之谓,孔子所谓「不知命,无以为君子」者也。故曰:「此困知、勉行,学者之事也。」

今以「尽心、知性、知天」为「格物、致知」,使初学之士尚未能不贰其心者,而遽责之以圣人生知、安行之事,如捕风捉影,茫然莫知所措其心,几何而不至于「率天下而路」也?今世致知、格物之弊亦居然可见矣。吾子所谓「务外遗内,博而寡要」者,无乃亦是过欤?此学问最紧要处,于此而差,将无往而不差矣。此鄙人之所以冒天下之非笑,忘其身之陷于罪戮,呶呶其言,其不容已者也。

来信说:「先生解释《大学》古本,说致其本体之知,这固然是孟子『尽心』的宗旨,朱子也以虚灵知觉为此心之量。然而『尽心』在于『知性』,『致知』在于『格物』。」

「尽心由于知性,致知在于格物」,这话是不错的。然而推究您的用意,说这话还有未明之处。朱子把「尽心、知性、知天」当作「物格、知至」,把「存心、养性、事天」当作「诚意、正心、修身」,把「夭寿不贰、修身以俟」当作「知至仁尽、圣人之事」。而依我的见解,恰与朱子相反。「尽心、知性、知天」是生知安行、圣人之事;「存心、养性、事天」是学知利行、贤人之事;「夭寿不贰、修身以俟」是困知勉行、学者之事。岂能专把「尽心知性」当作知、「存心养性」当作行呢?您骤然听到这话,必又以为骇人。然而其间实无可疑,让我为您一说。

心之体是性,性之本原是天。能尽其心,就是能尽其性了。《中庸》说:「惟天下至诚为能尽其性。」又说:「知天地之化育,质诸鬼神而无疑,知天也。」这只有圣人然后能做到,所以说这是生知安行、圣人之事。

存其心的人,是未能尽其心的人,所以必须加存养的功夫;必是存养得久了,不待存而自无不存,然后可以进而言尽。「知天」的知,如同知州、知县的知,知州则一州之事都是自己的事,知县则一县之事都是自己的事,这是与天合为一的;「事天」则如儿子侍奉父亲、臣子侍奉君主,还是与天为二。天所赋给我的,是心、是性,我只是存之不敢失、养之不敢害,如同「父母完整地生下我,我完整地归还父母」。所以说这是学知利行、贤人之事。

至于「夭寿不贰」,与存其心的人又有差距。存心的人虽未能尽其心,本已一心为善,偶有不存,存养回来就是了;如今要人「夭寿不贰」,是仍然拿夭寿贰其心的人;拿夭寿贰其心,说明为善之心还不能专一;存尚且做不到,谈什么尽呢?如今且要人不因夭寿而贰其为善之心,譬如说「死生夭寿都有定命」,我只是一心为善,修养自身以等待天命罢了——这说明他平日还不知有天命。「事天」虽与天为二,却已真知天命之所在,只是恭敬奉承罢了;至于说「俟」,是还不能真知天命所在,还在等待,所以叫「立命」。立是「创立」的立,如立德、立言、立功、立名之类。凡说立,都是从前未曾有而今才开始建立的意思,正是孔子所谓「不知命,无以为君子」。所以说这是困知勉行、学者之事。

如今把「尽心、知性、知天」当作「格物、致知」,让初学之士尚不能专一其心的人,一下子担起圣人生知安行之事,如同捕风捉影,茫然不知心往哪里放,怎能不至于「带着天下人疲于奔命」呢?当世致知格物之弊也显然可见了。您所谓「务外遗内、博而寡要」,恐怕也是这个过失吧?这是学问最紧要处,在这里错了,将无所不错。这就是我之所以冒天下人的非笑、忘掉自己身陷罪戮、喋喋不休而不能自已的缘故。

Your letter says: 'Your reading of the old text takes extending knowledge as extending the knowledge of the original substance — Mencius's aim of realizing the mind, and Zhu Xi too took the mind's empty numinous awareness as its measure. Yet realizing the mind rests on knowing nature; extending knowledge rests on investigating things.'

So far, right. Yet the intent behind your words remains unclear. Zhu Xi assigned realizing the mind, knowing nature, knowing Heaven to things investigated and knowledge extended; preserving the mind, nourishing nature, serving Heaven to sincerity, rectitude and self-cultivation; undivided by early death or long life, cultivating and awaiting, to knowledge complete and humaneness exhausted — the sage's affair. My view is the direct reverse. Realizing the mind, knowing nature, knowing Heaven belong to those born knowing who act at ease — the sage's affair; preserving the mind, nourishing nature, serving Heaven to learning and acting with advantage — the worthy's affair; undivided by lifespan, cultivating and awaiting, to knowing through hardship and acting through striving — the learner's affair. How can realizing and knowing be assigned to knowledge alone, preserving and nourishing to action alone? Hearing this you will be startled again; yet truly nothing in it is doubtful — let me state it.

The mind's substance is nature; nature's source is Heaven. To realize the mind fully is to realize nature fully. The Mean: only the utterly sincere can realize his nature; knowing Heaven-and-earth's transforming nourishment, tested before the spirits without doubt — this is knowing Heaven. Only the sage can do so — hence born knowing, acting at ease: the sage's affair.

To preserve the mind implies it is not yet fully realized; hence the work of preserving. Preserved long enough that preservation is no longer needed yet nothing unpreserved — only then may one speak of realizing. The knowing of knowing Heaven is the knowing of a prefect over his prefecture, a magistrate over his county: all its affairs one's own — one with Heaven. Serving Heaven is the son serving the father, the minister the ruler — still two with Heaven. What Heaven has conferred on me is mind and nature; I but preserve them, not daring to lose, nourish them, not daring to harm — as parents gave me whole and I return myself whole. Hence learning and advantage: the worthy's affair.

As to undivided by lifespan, that stands lower still than preserving the mind. The preserver, though not yet realizing, is already single-minded in good; when preservation lapses, he but returns to it. To bid one be undivided by lifespan is still to let lifespan divide the mind; divided, the heart for good is not yet single; not yet able even to preserve — what talk of realizing? Bid him not let lifespan divide his heart for good — 'death and life, early or late, are fixed by the Mandate; I am simply single-minded in good, cultivating myself and awaiting it' — that shows he does not yet know there is a Mandate. Serving Heaven, though two with Heaven, truly knows where the Mandate lies and but reverently attends it; 'awaiting' means not yet truly knowing where it lies, still waiting — hence 'establishing the Mandate'. Establish is found in establishing virtue, words, deeds, fame: what never was, now first set up — Confucius's not knowing the Mandate, one cannot be a noble person. Hence hardship and striving: the learner's affair.

To set realizing the mind, knowing nature, knowing Heaven as investigation and extension — charging beginners who cannot yet keep their hearts single with the born-knowing sage's task — is chasing wind and shadows, the mind nowhere to lodge, and cannot but lead the whole world running itself ragged. Today's defects in extension and investigation are plain to see. Your 'pursuing the outward, losing the inward; broad without essentials' — is it not this same fault? This is the most crucial point of learning: err here and there is no place one does not err. This is why I brave the world's ridicule, forget the perils to my person, and cannot hold my peace.

  1. 王本,「物格知致」作「物格知至」;「诚意正心修身」作「诚意正心」;「以殀寿不贰,修身以俟」作「以末节殀寿不贰,修身以俟」。
135

来书云:「闻语学者,乃谓『即物穷理』之说亦是玩物丧志,又取其『厌繁就约』、『涵养本原』数说标示学者,指为晚年定论,此亦恐非。」

朱子所谓「格物」云者,在「即物而穷其理」也。即物穷理是就事事物物上求其所谓定理者也,是以吾心而求理于事事物物之中,析心与理为二矣。夫求理于事事物物者,如求孝之理于其亲之谓也。求孝之理于其亲,则孝之理其果在于吾之心邪?抑果在于亲之身邪?假而果在于亲之身,则亲没之后,吾心遂无孝之理欤?见孺子之入井,必有恻隐之理,是恻隐之理果在于孺子之身欤?抑在于吾心之良知欤?其或不可以从之于井欤?其或可以手而援之欤?是皆所谓理也,是果在于孺子之身欤?抑果出于吾心之良知欤?以是例之,万事万物之理莫不皆然,是可以知析心与理为二之非矣。

夫析心与理而为二,此告子义外之说,孟子之所深辟也。「务外遗内,博而寡要」,吾子既已知之矣,是果何谓而然哉?谓之玩物丧志,尚犹以为不可欤?若鄙人所谓「致知、格物」者,致吾心之良知于事事物物也。吾心之良知,即所谓「天理」也。致吾心良知之「天理」于事事物物,则事事物物皆得其理矣。致吾心之良知者,致知也;事事物物皆得其理者,格物也,是合心与理而为一者也。合心与理而为一,则凡区区前之所云,与朱子晚年之论,皆可以不言而喻矣。

来信说:「听您对学者讲,竟说『即物穷理』之说也是玩物丧志,又取朱子『厌繁就约』『涵养本原』几段话标示学者,指为晚年定论,这恐怕也不对。」

朱子所谓「格物」,是在「即物而穷其理」。即物穷理,是就事事物物上求所谓定理,是以我心到事事物物之中去求理,把心与理分析为二了。在事事物物上求理,比如到父亲身上求孝的理。在父亲身上求孝之理,那孝之理果然在我的心中呢,还是果然在父亲的身上呢?假使果真在父亲身上,那么父亲去世之后,我心中就没有孝之理了吗?见小孩掉进井里,必有恻隐之理,这恻隐之理果然在孩子身上呢,还是在我心的良知呢?或者不可以跟着跳下井去,或者可以伸手援救,这都是所谓理,它果然在孩子身上呢,还是出于我心的良知呢?照此类推,万事万物之理莫不如此,由此可见把心与理分作二的错误了。

把心与理分作二,正是告子「义外」之说,是孟子所深加驳斥的。「务外遗内,博而寡要」,您既然已经知道,又是怎么会到这个地步的呢?说它是玩物丧志,还认为不可以吗?至于我所谓「致知格物」,是把 我心的良知推行到事事物物上。我心的良知就是所谓的天理。把我心良知的天理推行到事事物物,那么事事物物都得到理了。推行我心的良知,就是致知;事事物物都得其理,就是格物。这是心与理合而为一。心与理合而为一,那么我前面所说的一切,与朱子晚年的议论,都可以不言而喻了。

Your letter says: 'I hear you tell learners that even the doctrine of exhausting principle in things is trifling with things and losing the will, and that you cite Zhu Xi's passages on wearying of the manifold for the essential and nourishing the root, marking them his final late-year position — this too seems wrong.'

Zhu Xi's investigating things meant exhausting their principle in the things themselves — seeking a fixed principle in each affair and thing, carrying my mind out into things to find principle: mind and principle split in two. To seek principle in things is like seeking the principle of filial piety upon the parent's body. Is that principle truly in my mind, or upon the parent's body? Were it truly upon the body, then after the parent's death would my mind hold no principle of filial piety? Seeing a child fall into the well, the principle of compassion must stir — is it upon the child's body, or in my mind's innate knowledge? That one may not plunge in after it, or that one may extend a hand — these too are principles: upon the child's body, or out of my mind's innate knowledge? So with all things and affairs: hence the error of splitting mind and principle in two.

That split is Gaozi's rightness-external, deeply condemned by Mencius. That the age pursues the outward, loses the inward, broad without essentials — you already know it; how did it come about? And is 'trifling with things and losing the will' still too strong? My extension-and-investigation means extending my mind's innate knowledge to all affairs and things. That innate knowledge is precisely heavenly principle. Extending its principle to all things, all things receive their principle. Extending the mind's innate knowledge is extending knowledge; all things receiving principle is investigating things: mind and principle joined into one. Joined into one, all I have said, and Zhu Xi's late-year views, need no words to be understood.

136

来书云:「人之心体本无不明,而气拘物蔽,鲜有不昏;非学、问、思、辨以明天下之理,则善、恶之机,真、妄之辨,不能自觉;任情恣意,其害有不可胜言者矣。」

此段大略似是而非,盖承沿旧说之弊,不可以不辨也。夫问、思、辨、行,皆所以为学,未有学而不行者也。如言学孝,则必服劳奉养,躬行孝道,然后谓之学;岂徒悬空口耳讲说,而遂可以谓之学孝乎?学射则必张弓挟矢,引满中的;学书则必伸纸执笔,操觚染翰。尽天下之学,无有不行而可以言学者,则学之始固已即是行矣。笃者,敦实笃厚之意。已行矣,而敦笃其行,不息其功之谓尔。盖学之不能以无疑,则有问,问即学也,即行也;又不能无疑,则有思,思即学也,即行也;又不能无疑,则有辨,辨即学也,即行也。辨既明矣,思既慎矣,问既审矣,学既能矣,又从而不息其功焉,斯之谓笃行。非谓学问思辨之后,而始措之于行也。

是故以求能其事而言谓之学,以求解其惑而言谓之问,以求通其说而言谓之思,以求精其察而言谓之辨,以求履其实而言谓之行:盖析其功而言则有五,合其事而言则一而已。此区区心、理合一之体,知、行并进之功,所以异于后世之说者,正在于是。

今吾子特举学、问、思、辨,以穷天下之理,而不及笃行,是专以学、问、思、辨为知,而谓穷理为无行也已;天下岂有不行而学者邪?岂有不行而遂可谓之穷理者邪?明道云:「只穷理便尽性至命。」故必仁极仁而后谓之能穷仁之理,义极义而后谓之能穷义之理。仁极仁则尽仁之性矣,义极义则尽义之性矣,学至于穷理,至矣,而尚未措之于行,天下宁有是邪?是故知不行之不可以为学,则知不行之不可以为穷理矣,知不行之不可以为穷理,则知「知、行」之合一并进,而不可以分为两节事矣。

夫万事万物之理,不外于吾心;而必曰穷天下之理,是殆以吾心之良知为未足,而必外求于天下之广,以裨补增益之,是犹析心与理而为二也。夫学、问、思、辨、笃行之功,虽其困勉至于人一己百,而扩充之极,至于尽性、知天,亦不过致吾心之良知而已;良知之外,岂复有加于毫末乎?今必曰穷天下之理,而不知反求诸其心,则凡所谓善、恶之机,真、妄之辨者,舍吾心之良知,亦将何所致其体察乎?吾子所谓气拘物蔽者,拘此蔽此而已。今欲去此之蔽,不知致力于此,而欲以外求,是犹目之不明者不务服药调理以治其目,而徒伥伥然求明于其外;明岂可以自外而得哉?任情恣意之害,亦以不能精察天理于此心之良知而已。此诚毫厘千里之谬者,不容于不辨,吾子毋谓其论之太刻也。

来信说:「人的心体本无不明白,但被气禀所拘、物欲所蔽,少有不昏暗的;若不靠学、问、思、辨以明了天下之理,那么善恶的机微、真妄的分辨,便不能自觉;任情恣意,其害处有说不完的。」

这一段大似是而非,是承袭旧说的毛病,不能不辨。问、思、辨、行都是所以为学,没有学了而不行的。譬如学孝,必须服劳奉养、躬行孝道,然后才叫作学;岂是悬空口耳讲说,便可以叫作学孝吗?学射必须张弓挟矢、引满中的;学书必须伸纸执笔、操觚染翰。尽天下之学,没有不行而可以称为学的,那么学之始就已经是行了。笃,是敦实笃厚的意思。已经行了,又敦笃其行、不停息其功夫,如此而已。学不能没有疑问,于是有问,问就是学,就是行;又不能无疑,于是有思,思就是学,就是行;又不能无疑,于是有辨,辨就是学,就是行。辨已明、思已慎、问已审、学已能,又从而功夫不息,这才叫笃行。并不是学问思辨之后,才放到行上去。

所以,就求能其事而言叫作学,就求解其惑而言叫作问,就求通其说而言叫作思,就求精其察而言叫作辨,就求履其实而言叫作行:分析其功夫而言有五件,合并其事而言只是一件。我的心理合一之体、知行并进之功,之所以异于后世的说法,正在于此。

如今您特别举出学、问、思、辨以求穷天下之理,却不提笃行,这是专把学问思辨当作知,而把穷理看作无行了。天下岂有不行的学者?岂有不行而可以称为穷理的?程颢说:「只穷理便尽性至命。」所以必须仁到极仁然后才叫能穷仁之理,义到极义然后才叫能穷义之理。仁到极仁便尽了仁之性,义到极义便尽了义之性。学到了穷理,算是到了顶点,却还没有放到行上去,天下哪有这样的道理?所以知道不行不足以称为学,就知道不行不足以称为穷理;知道不行不足以称为穷理,就知道知行合一并进,不可分作两截事了。

万事万物之理,不外于我心;却一定要说穷天下之理,这大概是以为我心的良知还不够,必须向外求于天下之广,来补贴增益它,这仍是把心与理分作二。学问思辨笃行的功夫,即使困勉到人一己百的地步,扩充到极处,至于尽性知天,也不过是要致我心的良知而已;良知之外,难道还有分毫可加的吗?如今一定要说穷天下之理,却不知道反求于心,那么凡所谓善恶之机、真妄之辨,离开我心的良知,又到哪里去体察呢?您所谓气拘物蔽,拘的蔽的正是这个。如今要除去这遮蔽,不在 这上下功夫,却想向外求,就像眼睛不明的人不服药调理治眼睛,只是徒然向外求明;明难道可以从外面得来吗?任情恣意的害处,也只是不能在此心的良知上精察天理罢了。这真是毫厘千里之谬,不能不辨,您不要说这议论太苛刻。

Your letter says: 'The mind's substance is never unclear in itself, but confined by endowment and veiled by desires few escape dimness; without study, inquiry, thought and discrimination to illumine the world's principles, the springs of good and evil, of true and false, cannot be self-known; to follow feeling and whim works uncountable harm.'

This passage is near-truth and yet not truth, heir to the old defect; it cannot pass unexamined. Inquiry, thought, discrimination and action are all learning; there is no learning without action. To learn filial piety one must serve and support, practice it in person — could empty talk of mouth and ear count as learning it? To learn archery one must bend the bow, nock the arrow, draw full and hit the mark; to learn writing, spread paper, take brush, apply ink. Of all learning under heaven none is learning without doing: the moment learning begins, action has begun. Earnestness means solid and unwearied: already acting, and making the acting firm, the work unceasing. Doubt breeds inquiry — inquiry is learning, is action; doubt again, thought — thought is learning, is action; doubt again, discrimination — discrimination is learning, is action. When discrimination is clear, thought careful, inquiry sifted, learning mastered, and still the work does not cease — that is earnest practice. Not that after study, inquiry, thought and discrimination the deed is then appended.

Thus: seeking ability in the affair is called study; seeking release from doubt, inquiry; seeking coherence, thought; seeking fineness of discernment, discrimination; seeking to tread the substance, action. Analyzed, five; in the affair, one. Here my unity of mind and principle, the joint advance of knowledge and action, parts ways from later doctrine.

You now single out study, inquiry, thought and discrimination to exhaust the world's principle and omit earnest practice — assigning them all to knowledge and treating the exhausting of principle as devoid of action. Is there under heaven a learner who does not act? One who without acting could be said to exhaust principle? Cheng Hao said: exhausting principle alone, one fulfills nature and arrives at the Mandate. Only humaneness utterly humane deserves the name of exhausting humanity's principle; only rightness utterly right, rightness's. Utterly humane, human nature is fulfilled; utterly right, rightness's nature is. Learning that reaches the exhausting of principle has reached its top — and still not set into action: is there such a thing under heaven? Knowing that without action there is no learning, one knows that without action there is no exhausting of principle; knowing that, one knows knowledge and action advance as one and cannot be cut in two.

The principles of the myriad things lie not outside my mind; yet one must say 'exhaust the world's principle' — as if my mind's innate knowledge were insufficient and must be patched from the world's breadth without: again mind and principle made two. The work of study, inquiry, thought, discrimination and earnest practice — even pushed through hardship a hundredfold, expanded to fulfilling nature and knowing Heaven — is nothing beyond extending my mind's innate knowledge; beyond innate knowledge, is a hair's breadth to be added? To insist on exhausting the world's principle without turning back to the mind: the springs of good and evil, the dividing of true and false — leaving the mind's innate knowledge, where would one examine them? Your 'confined by endowment, veiled by things' confines and veils precisely this. To remove the veil yet not work here, seeking outside — like a man with failing sight who will not take medicine to cure the eye but gropes abroad for brightness: can brightness be fetched from outside? The harm of following whim is likewise nothing but failing to examine heavenly principle finely in this mind's innate knowledge. Here is the hair that becomes a thousand miles; it cannot go unexamined — do not call the argument too severe.

137

来书云:「教人以致知、明德,而戒其即物穷理,诚使昏暗之士,深居端坐,不闻教告,遂能至于知致而德明乎?纵令静而有觉,稍悟本性,则亦定慧无用之见;果能知古今、达事变,而致用于天下国家之实否乎?其曰:『知者意之体,物者意之用[1],格物如格君心之非之格』。语虽超悟,独得不踵陈见,抑恐于道未相吻合。」

区区论致知格物,正所以穷理,未尝戒人穷理,使之深居端坐而一无所事也。若谓即物穷理,如前所云「务外而遗内」者,则有所不可耳。昏訚之士,果能随事随物精察此心之天理,以致其本然之良知,则虽愚必明,虽柔必强,大本立而达道行,九经之属,可一以贯之而无遗矣。尚何患其无致用之实乎?彼顽空虚静之徒,正惟不能随事随物精察此心之天理,以致其本然之良知,而遗弃伦理,寂灭虚无以为常,是以要之不可以治家国天下。孰谓圣人穷理尽性之学,而亦有是弊哉?

心者,身之主也,而心之虚灵明觉,即所谓本然之良知也。其虚灵明觉之良知应感而动者,谓之意。有知而后有意,无知则无意矣。知非意之体乎?意之所用必有其物,物即事也。如意用于事亲,既事亲为一物;意用于治民,即治民为一物;意用于读书,即读书为一物;意用于听讼,则听讼为一物。凡意之所用,无有无物者;有是意即有是物,无是意即无是物矣,物非意之用乎?

「格」字之义,有以「至」字之训者,如「格于文祖」、「有苗来格」,是以「至」训者也。然「格于文祖」,必纯孝诚敬,幽明之间无一不得其理,而后谓之「格」;有苗之顽,实以文德诞敷而后格,则亦兼有「正」字之义在其间,未可专以「至」字尽之也。如「格其非心」、「大臣格君心之非」之类,是则一皆「正其不正以归于正」之义,而不可以「至」字为训矣。且《大学》「格物」之训,又安知其不以「正」字为训,而必以「至」字为义乎?如以「至」字为义者,必曰「穷至事物之理」,而后其说始通。是其用功之要,全在一「穷」字;用力之地,全在一「理」字也。若上去一穷[2],下去一理字,而直曰「致知在至物」,其可通乎?

夫「穷理尽性」,圣人之成训,见于《繄辞》[3]者也。苟「格物」之说而果即「穷理」之义,则圣人何不直曰「致知在穷理」,而必为此转折不完之语,以启后世之弊邪?盖《大学》「格物」之说,自与《繄辞》「穷理」大旨虽同,而微有分辨。「穷理」者,兼格、致、诚、正而为功也。故言「穷理」,则格、致、诚、正之功皆在其中;言「格物」,则必兼举致知、诚意、正心,而后其功始备而密。今偏举「格物」而遂谓之「穷理」,此所以专以「穷理」属「知」,而谓「格物」未常有「行」,非惟不得「格物」之旨,并「穷理」之义而失之矣。此后世之学所以析知、行为先后两截,日以支离决裂,而圣学益以残晦者,其端实始于此。吾子盖亦未免承沿积习,则以为「于道未相吻合」不为过矣。

来信说:「先生教人致知、明德,却戒人即物穷理。假使昏暗的人深居静坐,不闻教诲,就能达到知致而德明吗?纵使静中有觉,稍稍悟到本性,也只是定慧无用之见;真能通晓古今、通达事变,对天下国家有实用的功效吗?您说『知者意之体,物者意之用,格物如格君心之非之格』,话虽超悟独得、不循旧见,只恐与圣道未必吻合。」

我论致知格物,正是用来穷理,从未戒人穷理、让他深居静坐而一无所事。至于即物穷理,如前面所说的「务外而遗内」,则是不可以的。昏暗的人,果能随事随物精察此心的天理,以致使他本然的良知,那么虽愚必明、虽柔必强,大本立而达道行,九经之类,可以一以贯之而无遗,还怕没有实用的功效吗?那些死守空寂虚静的人,正因为不能随事随物精察此心的天理、以致使本然的良知,而遗弃人伦,以寂灭虚无为常,所以才不可用来治家国天下。谁说圣人穷理尽性之学也有这种弊端呢?

心是身的主宰,而心的虚灵明觉,就是所谓本然的良知。虚灵明觉的良知因感应而发动的,叫作意。有知然后有意,没有知就没有意了。知不是意之体吗?意的作用必有其对象,物就是事。如意用于事亲,事亲就是一物;意用于治民,治民就是一物;意用于读书,读书就是一物;意用于听讼,听讼就是一物。凡意之所在,没有无物的;有这个意就有这个物,没有这个意就没有这个物。物不是意之用吗?

「格」字的意义,有用「至」字解释的,如「格于文祖」「有苗来格」,这是用「至」作训。然而「格于文祖」,必是纯孝诚敬,幽明之间无一不得其理,然后才叫格;有苗之顽,实因文德广布而后至,其中也兼有「正」字的意义,不能专拿一个「至」字说尽。如「格其非心」「大臣格君心之非」之类,则全是「正其不正以归于正」的意思,不能用「至」字作解。而且《大学》「格物」的训释,又怎么知道它不用「正」字作训,而必定用「至」字作义呢?如以「至」字为义,必说「穷至事物之理」,然后其说才通。这样用功的要领全在一个「穷」字,用力的对象全在一个「理」字。若去掉上一「穷」字、下一「理」字,径直说「致知在至物」,能通吗?

「穷理尽性」是圣人的成训,见于《易·系辞》。如果「格物」之说果然就是「穷理」之义,那么圣人为什么不径直说「致知在穷理」,而必定说这种转折不完的话,来启后世的弊端呢?《大学》「格物」之说与《系辞》「穷理」大旨虽同,而微有分别:「穷理」兼格、致、诚、正而为功。所以说「穷理」,则格致诚正的功夫都在其中;说「格物」,则必兼举致知、诚意、正心,然后其功才完备而周密。如今偏举「格物」便称之为「穷理」,这就是专把「穷理」归属知,而说「格物」未尝有行——不但没得到「格物」的宗旨,连「穷理」之义也失掉了。后世之学之所以把知行析为先后两截,日益支离决裂,圣学日益残缺晦暗,其开端实在这里。您大概也未免承袭积习,所以认为「与圣道未相吻合」也不为过。

Your letter says: 'You teach extending knowledge and brightening virtue but warn against exhausting principle in things. Were the dim to sit alone in deep seclusion, hearing no instruction, would they reach extended knowledge and bright virtue? Even if stillness brings some awareness, a glimpse of nature — that is but the useless seeing of Chan stillness; could it truly know past and present, meet changing affairs, be of real use to state and world? And your words — knowledge is the substance of intention, things are intention's employment; ge is as in correcting the ruler's erring mind — though transcendent and untrammeled by old views, I fear they miss the Way.'

My doctrine of extension and investigation is precisely for exhausting principle; I never forbade the exhausting of principle for idle sitting. Exhausting principle in things, as the 'pursuing the outward, losing the inward' of before — that alone I disallow. If the dim truly examine this mind's heavenly principle affair by affair, thing by thing, so extending their innate knowledge, then though dull they will grow bright, though weak strong; the great root stands, the reached Way moves, the nine standards thread through without remainder — where is the lack of practical use? Those dead-set on vacancy and stillness, precisely because they cannot thus examine and extend, abandon human relations, take extinction and nothingness as constant — hence they cannot order family, state or world. Who says the sages' learning of exhausting principle and fulfilling nature carries that defect?

The mind is the body's master; its empty, numinous, bright awareness is the innate knowledge in itself. Stirred by response, it is called intention. Knowledge first, then intention; no knowledge, no intention — is knowledge not intention's substance? Intention's employment must have its object, and the object is the affair: intention on serving parents, serving parents is the thing; on governing the people, governing is the thing; on reading, reading; on hearing lawsuits, the hearing. Wherever intention is, there is a thing; the intention present, the thing present; absent, absent — is the thing not intention's employment?

Of ge, some gloss it as 'arrive': arrived at the Ancestral Temple, the Miao came. But arriving at the Temple means pure filial sincerity and reverence, everything rightly ordered in the seen and unseen worlds, and only then ge; the wild Miao came only when civil virtue was spread wide — the sense of 'correct' is mixed in, not exhausted by 'arrive'. In correcting the erring heart, correcting the ruler's erring mind, it is wholly rectifying the incorrect to return to the correct — not 'arrive'. And how do we know the Great Learning's ge was not glossed 'correct' rather than 'arrive'? On 'arrive' one must say exhaust-arrive at the principles of things before it parses — the pivot of effort in exhaust, the field in principle. Drop the exhaust above and the principle below and say extension of knowledge lies in arriving at things: does that parse?

That exhausting principle fulfills nature is the sage's settled teaching in the Commentaries. Were investigating things simply exhausting principle, why did the sage not say outright extension of knowledge lies in exhausting principle, instead of this winding, unfinished phrase to open later ages' defects? The Great Learning's ge shares the great aim of exhausting principle yet differs subtly: exhausting principle comprises investigation, extension, sincerity and rectification as its work. Say exhausting principle and all four are included; say investigating things and extension, sincerity and rectification must be jointly named before the work is complete and tight. To single out investigating things and call it exhausting principle assigns exhausting wholly to knowledge and denies investigation any action — losing not only the intent of ge but the sense of exhausting itself. Hence the later split of knowledge and action into first and second halves, daily more fragmented, the sagely learning daily more broken and dark — the source lies just here. You too, heir to long habit, may well deem it 'not to fit the Way' — not wrongly.

  1. 此语不见于《王文成公全集》,可能出自《古本大学旁释》,该书已佚。
  2. 施本、俞本,穷字下有「字」字,《年谱》引此文亦同。
  3. 「穷理尽性以至于命」,出自《易经·说卦》,此处误忆为出自《易经·系辞》。
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来书云:「谓致知之功,将如何为温凊、如何为奉养即是『诚意』[1],非别有所谓『格物』,此亦恐非。」

此乃吾子自以己意揣度鄙见而为是说,非鄙人之所以告吾子者矣。若果如吾子之言,宁复有可通乎?

盖鄙人之见,则谓意欲温凊、意欲奉养者,所谓「意」也,而未可谓之「诚意」。必实行其温凊、奉养之意,务求自慊而无自欺,然后谓之「诚意」。

知如何而为温凊之节、知如何而为奉养之宜者,所谓「知」也,而未可谓之「致知」。必致其知如何为温凊之节者之知,而实以之温凊;致其知如何为奉养之宜者之知,而实以之奉养,然后谓之「致知」。

温凊之事、奉养之事,所谓「物」也,而未可谓之「格物」。必其于温凊之事也,一如其良知之所知当如何为温凊之节者而为之,无一毫之不尽;于奉养之事也,一如其良知之所知当如何为奉养之宜者而为之,无一毫之不尽,然后谓之「格物」。

温凊之物格,然后知温凊之良知始致;奉养之物格,然后知奉养之良知始致。故曰:「物格而后知至。」致其知温凊之良知,而后温凊之意始诚;致其知奉养之良知,而后奉养之意始诚。故曰:「知至而后意诚。」此区区「诚意、致知、格物」之说盖如此。吾子更熟思之,将亦无可疑者矣。

来信说:「您说致知的功夫,如怎样去做温凊、怎样去做奉养就是『诚意』,并非另外还有所谓『格物』,这恐怕也不对。」

这是您以己意揣度我的见解而造成的说法,并不是我告诉您的。若真如您所说,还能讲得通吗?

依我的见解:想要温凊、想要奉养,这就是所谓「意」,但还不可以称为「诚意」。必须切实实行温凊奉养之意,务求自我满足而无自欺,然后才叫「诚意」。

知道怎样做温凊的节度、知道怎样做奉养的合宜,这就是所谓「知」,但还不可以称为「致知」。必须致其知道如何温凊之知,而切实用来温凊;致其知道如何奉养之知,而切实用来奉养,然后才叫「致知」。

温凊之事、奉养之事,这就是所谓「物」,但还不可以称为「格物」。必须是在温凊之事上,一如良知所知的当如何温凊之节度那样去做,无一毫不尽;在奉养之事上,一如良知所知的当如何奉养之宜那样去做,无一毫不尽,然后才叫「格物」。

温凊之物格了,然后知温凊的良知才算致;奉养之物格了,然后知奉养的良知才算致。所以说「物格而后知至」。致了知温凊的良知,然后温凊之意才诚;致了知奉养的良知,然后奉养之意才诚。所以说「知至而后意诚」。我的「诚意、致知、格物」之说大概如此。您再细想,也将无可疑了。

Your letter says: 'You make the work of extension such that doing the warming and the support is itself sincerity — no separate investigating things. This too seems wrong.'

That is your own conjecture reshaping my view, not what I told you. As you frame it, would it even parse?

In my view: to intend warming, to intend support — that is intention, not yet sincerity. Only when the intention is actually carried out, seeking self-content without self-deception, is it sincerity.

Knowing the fit measures of warming and support — that is knowledge, not yet extension. Only when the knowledge of the measures is extended and actually applied in warming, and the knowledge of fit support applied in supporting, is it extension.

The affair of warming, the affair of support — those are things, not yet investigation. Only when in warming one does exactly what innate knowledge knows as the fit measure, to the last hair, and in support likewise, is it investigation.

The thing of warming investigated, the innate knowledge of warming is extended; the thing of support investigated, the innate knowledge of support is extended — hence things investigated, then knowledge arrives. The innate knowledge of warming extended, the intention of warming becomes sincere — hence knowledge arrives, then intention is sincere. Such is my doctrine of sincerity, extension and investigation. Think it over and no doubt will remain.

  1. 或断句为:将如何为温凊、如何为奉养?即是『诚意』
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来书云:「道之大端易于明白,所谓『良知、良能,愚夫愚妇可与及者』。至于节目时变之详,毫厘千里之谬,必待学而后知。今语孝于温凊定省,孰不知之?至于舜之不告而娶,武之不葬而兴师,养志、养口,小杖、大杖,割股、庐墓等事,处常、处变,过与不及之间,必须讨论是非,以为制事之本,然后心体无蔽,临事无失。」

「道之大端易于明白」,此语诚然。顾后之学者忽其易于明白者而弗由,而求其难于明白者以为学,此其所以「道在迩而求诸远,事在易而求诸难」也。孟子云:「夫道若大路然,岂难知哉?人病不由耳。」良知、良能,愚夫、愚妇与圣人同;但惟圣人能致其良知,而愚夫、愚妇不能致,此圣、愚之所由分也。节目时变,圣人夫岂不知?但不专以此为学。而其所谓学者,正惟致其良知,以精审此心之天理,而与后世之学不同耳。吾子未暇真知之致,而汲汲焉顾是之忧,此正求其难于明白者以为学之蔽也。

夫良知之于节目时变,犹规矩、尺度之于方圆、长短也;节目时变之不可预定,犹方圆、长短之不可胜穷也。故规矩诚立,则不可欺以方圆,而天下之方圆不可胜用矣;尺度诚陈,则不可欺以长短,而天下之长短不可胜用矣;良知诚致,则不可欺以节目时变,而天下之节目时变不可胜应矣。毫厘千里之谬,不于吾心良知一念之微而察之,亦将何所用其学乎?是不以规矩而欲定天下之方圆,不以尺度而欲尽天下之长短,吾见其乖张谬戾,日劳而无成也已。

吾子谓:「语孝于温凊定省,孰不知之?」然而能致其知者鲜矣。若谓粗知温凊定省之仪节,而遂谓之能致其知,则凡知君之当仁者,皆可谓之能致其仁之知,知臣之当忠者,皆可谓之能致其忠之知,则天下孰非致知者邪?以是而言,可以知致知之必在于行,而不行之不可以为致知也明矣。知、行合一之体,不益较然矣乎?

夫舜之不告而娶,岂舜之前已有不告而娶者为之准则,故舜得以考之何典,问诸何人,而为此邪?抑亦求诸其心一念之真知,权轻重之宜,不得已而为此邪?武之不葬而兴师,岂武之前已有不葬而兴师者为之准则,故武得以考之何典,问诸何人,而为此邪?抑亦求诸其心一念之良知,权轻重之宜,不得已而为此邪?使舜之心而非诚于为无后,武之心而非诚于为救民,则其不告而娶与不葬而兴师,乃不孝、不忠之大者。而后之人不务致其良知,以精察义理于此心感应酬酢之间,顾欲悬空讨论此等变常之事,执之以为制事之本,以求临事之无失,其亦远矣。其余数端,皆可类推,则古人致知之学,从可知矣。

来信说:「道的大端容易明白,所谓『良知良能,愚夫愚妇也能领会』。至于节目时变的详情、毫厘千里的谬误,必须学习然后才知。如今讲孝,谁不知道温凊定省?至于舜不告而娶、武王不葬而兴师、养志与养口、小杖与大杖、割股庐墓等事,处常与处变、过与不及之间,必须讨论是非,作为处事之本,然后心体无蔽、临事无失。」

「道之大端易于明白」,这话诚然。但后世学者忽视那容易明白的而不去遵循,却去求那难以明白的作为学问,这就是「道在近处却向远处求,事本容易却往难处求」。孟子说:「道就像大路一样,难道难以知晓吗?人的毛病在于不去走罢了。」良知良能,愚夫愚妇与圣人相同;只是圣人能致其良知,而愚夫愚妇不能致,这就是圣人与愚人的分野。节目时变,圣人岂有不知的?只是不专以此作为学问。他所学的,正是致其良知,以精审此心的天理,而与后世之学不同罢了。您不去致力于真知的致,却急急忙忙只担忧这些,这正是求难以明白者以为学的蒙蔽。

良知对于节目时变,就像规矩尺度对于方圆长短;节目时变不可预定,正如方圆长短不可穷尽。所以规矩果真立了,就不能拿方圆来欺它,而天下的方圆不可胜用了;尺度果真陈设了,就不能拿长短来欺它,而天下的长短不可胜用了;良知果真致了,就不能拿节目时变来欺它,而天下的节目时变不可胜应了。毫厘千里之谬,不在我心良知一念之微处省察,又能把学问用在哪里呢?这是不用规矩却要定天下的方圆,不用尺度却要尽天下的长短,我看只有乖张谬戾、日劳而无成罢了。

您说「讲孝于温凊定省,谁不知道」,然而能致其知的太少了。若说粗略知道温凊定省的仪节,便叫能致其知,那么凡是知道君当仁的,都可以叫能致其仁之知;知道臣当忠的,都可以叫能致其忠之知,那天下谁不是致知者呢?由此说来,致知必在于行、不行不可为致知,就很明白了。知行合一之体,不更加昭然了吗?

舜不告而娶,难道是舜之前已有不告而娶的人作了准则,所以舜能考之何典、问诸何人而这样做吗?还是求之于其心一念之良知,权衡轻重的合宜,不得已而这样做呢?武王不葬而兴师,难道是武王之前已有不告而兴师的准则,所以武王得以考之何典、问诸何人而这样做吗?还是求之于其心一念之良知,权衡轻重的合宜,不得已而这样做呢?假使舜之心不是真诚于不绝后嗣,武王之心不是真诚于救民,那么不告而娶与不葬而兴师,就是不孝不忠的大者。而后人不务致其良知,以在此心感应酬酢之间精察义理,却想悬空讨论这类反常之事,拿它作处事之本,以求临事无失,也就差得太远了。其余几端都可类推,那么古人致知之学,从此可以知道了。

Your letter says: 'The great outline of the Way is easy to see — innate knowledge and ability that ploughman and ploughwife can reach. But the details of circumstance and the hairspread-thousand-mile errors must be learned. Speak of filial piety: who does not know warming and inquiring? But Shun marrying without first telling his parents, King Wu taking the field before his father's burial, nourishing the will or the mouth, small rod or great, slicing the thigh, the mourning hut — constancy and crisis, excess and shortfall — these must be weighed for right and wrong as the touchstone of conduct, else the mind-substance stays veiled and affairs go wrong.'

That the great outline is easy to see — true. Yet later scholars slight what is easy to see and do not walk it, and study what is hard to see: the Way near, they seek it far; the task easy, they make it hard. Mencius: the Way is like a great road — is it hard to know? The sickness is not walking it. Innate knowledge and ability are one in ploughman and sage; only the sage can extend it, the ploughman cannot — there lies the divide. Details and changes — did the sage not know them? He simply did not make them his study. His study was precisely extending innate knowledge, refining the mind's heavenly principle — unlike later learning. You neglect the extending of true knowledge and fret anxiously over these — the very veil of studying the hard-to-see.

Innate knowledge toward details and changes is as compass and square toward circles and squares, the rule toward lengths: details cannot be fixed in advance any more than all circles and lengths can be enumerated. With compass and square truly set, none can deceive you about round and square, and the world's rounds and squares are inexhaustibly yours; with the rule laid down, none deceive you about length; with innate knowledge truly extended, none can deceive you about details and changes, and the world's details and changes are inexhaustibly met. The hairspread error — if it is not examined in the subtlety of a single thought of the mind's innate knowledge, where else would one's learning be applied? To fix the world's rounds without compass, exhaust its lengths without rule — I see only distortion and error, daily toil and no attainment.

You say: speak of filial piety in warming and inquiring — who does not know it? Yet those who extend that knowledge are few. If a rough notion of the ritual counted as extending knowledge, then all who know a ruler should be humane could be said to extend their knowledge of humaneness, all who know a minister should be loyal, of loyalty — who under heaven would not be extending knowledge? So seen, extension must lie in action, and without action there is no extension — and is not the unity of knowledge and action the plainer?

Did Shun, marrying unannounced, have a precedent to consult, a person to ask — or did he appeal to the true knowledge of a single thought in his mind, weigh the balance of weights, and act under necessity? Did King Wu, marching before burial, find a rule in some canon — or weigh the fitness in the innate knowledge of one thought and act under necessity? Had Shun's heart not been sincerely set on not cutting off the line, Wu's not sincerely on saving the people, then unannounced marriage and marching before burial would be the greatest of impieties and disloyalties. Later people, not extending their innate knowledge to examine rightness amid the mind's responses and exchanges, would hang in mid-air discussing such anomalies and clutch them as the touchstone of conduct, hoping to err nothing in the event — how far astray! The other cases follow by analogy, and the ancients' learning of extension may be known from this.

140

来书云:「谓《大学》『格物』之说,专求本心,犹可牵合;至于《六经》、《四书》所载『多闻多见』、『前言往行』、『好古敏求』、『博学审问』、『温故知新』、『博学详说』、『好问好察』,是皆明白求于事为之际,资于论说之间者,用功节目固不容紊矣。」

「格物」之义,前已详悉,「牵合」之疑,想已不俟复解矣。

至于「多闻多见」,乃孔子因子张之务外好高,徒欲以多闻多见为学,而不能求诸其心,以阙疑殆,此其言行所以不免于尤悔。而所谓见闻者,适以资其务外好高而已,盖所以救子张多闻多见之病,而非以是教之为学也。夫子尝曰:「盖有不知而作之者,我无是也。」是犹孟子「是非之心,人皆有之」之义也。此言正所以明德性之良知非由于闻见耳。若曰「多闻择其善者而从之,多见而识之」,则是专求诸见闻之末,而已落在第二义矣,故曰:「如之次也。」夫以见闻之知为次,则所谓知之上者,果安所指乎?是可以窥圣门致知用力之地矣。夫子谓子贡曰:「赐也,汝以予为多学而识之者欤?非也,予一以贯之。」使诚在于「多学而识」,则夫子胡乃谬为是说以欺子贡者邪?「一以贯之」,非致其良知而何?

《易》曰:「君子多识前言往行,以畜其德。」夫以畜其德为心,则凡多识前言往行者,孰非畜德之事?此正知、行合一之功矣。

「好古敏求」者,好古人之学而敏求此心之理耳。心即理也。学者,学此心也;求者,求此心也。孟子云:「学问之道无他,求其放心而已矣。」非若后世广记博诵古人之言词,以为好古;而汲汲然惟以求功名利达之具于外者也。

「博学、审问」,前言已尽。

「温故、知新」,朱子亦以「温故」属之「尊德性」矣。德性岂可以外求哉?惟夫「知新」必由于「温故」,而「温故」乃所以「知新」,则亦可以验知、行之非两节矣。

「博学而详说之」者,「将以反说约也」。若无「反约」之云,则「博学、详说」者,果何事邪?

舜之「好问好察」,惟以用中而致其精一于道心耳。道心者,良知之谓也。

君子之学,何尝离去事为而废论说?但其从事于事为、论说者,要皆知、行合一之功,正所以致其本心之良知,而非若世之徒事口耳谈说以为知者,分知、行为两事,而果有节目先后之可言也。

来信说:「您说《大学》『格物』之说专求本心,还可以牵强附会;至于《六经》《四书》所载『多闻多见』『前言往行』『好古敏求』『博学审问』『温故知新』『博学详说』『好问好察』,都是明白地求之于事为之际、取资于论说之间的,用功的节目本不容紊乱。」

「格物」之义,前面已经详说,「牵合」的疑问,想必不必再解了。

至于「多闻多见」,是孔子因子张务外好高、只想以多闻多见为学,而不能求之于心、以存疑阙殆,所以他的言行不免有过尤悔恨。而所谓的见闻,恰恰只助长了他务外好高的毛病。这是救治子张多闻多见之病的话,并不是拿这个教人为学。夫子曾说:「大概有不知而妄作的人,我没有这种事。」这也正是孟子「是非之心,人皆有之」的意思。这话正说明德性之良知不是出于闻见。若说「多闻择其善者而从之,多见而识之」,那是专求于见闻之末,已落在第二义了,所以说「是知之次也」。以见闻之知为次,那么所谓知之上者,究竟指什么呢?由此可以窥见圣门致知用力的地方了。夫子对子贡说:「赐啊,你以为我是多学而记之的人吗?不是,我一以贯之。」假使真在于多学而记,夫子为什么竟谬说这话来欺子贡呢?「一以贯之」,不是致其良知又是什么?

《易》说:「君子多识前言往行,以畜其德。」以畜其德为心,那么多识前言往行,哪一件不是畜德之事?这正是知行合一的功夫。

所谓「好古敏求」,是喜好古人之学而敏求此心之理罢了。心就是理。学,是学这个心;求,是求这个心。孟子说:「学问之道没有别的,求其放心而已矣。」并不像后世广泛记诵古人的言词以为是好古,而汲汲于向外求功名利禄的工具。

「博学审问」,前面已经说尽。

「温故知新」,朱子也把「温故」归属于「尊德性」了。德性难道可以外求吗?正因为「知新」必由于「温故」,而「温故」正是用来「知新」的,也就可以验证知与行并非两截。

「博学而详说之」,是「将要反过来简约地陈述」。若没有「反约」一说,那博学详说究竟是为了什么呢?

舜的「好问好察」,只是要用法中之道,把精一达到道心上。道心,就是良知。

君子之学,何尝离开事为、废弃论说?只是他从事的事为、论说,都是知行合一的功夫,正是要致其本心的良知,而不像世上那些只以口耳谈说为知的人,把知行分作两事,当真有什么节目先后可言。

Your letter says: 'That the Great Learning's investigating things seeks the mind alone might yet be stretched to fit; but the classics' many phrases — hear much, see much; former words and past deeds; love the ancients and earnestly seek; learn broadly and inquire; warm the old and know the new; study broadly and expound; love to ask and observe — all plainly seek amid affairs and draw upon discourse; the order of work brooks no confusion.'

The sense of investigating things was set out fully before; the charge of forced fitting needs no second answer.

As to hearing and seeing much: Confucius spoke so because Zizhang pursued the outward and the lofty, would make hearing-and-seeing itself his learning, and would not seek in his mind or leave the doubtful in suspense — hence his words and deeds earned blame and regret; the seen and heard only fed his fault. It was medicine for Zizhang's illness, not a curriculum. The Master said: there are those who act without knowing; I am not so — the very sense of Mencius's sense of right and wrong, all men have it: virtue's innate knowledge does not arise from hearing and seeing. To hear much and choose the good to follow, see much and remember — that seeks the twig-ends of sight and hearing, already second-best: hence it is called the next best to knowledge. If hearing-and-seeing knowledge is the next best, what is the best? Here is glimpsed where the school applied its strength in extending knowledge. The Master said to Zigong: Si, do you take me for one who learns much and remembers? No — one thread through all. Were it truly much learning and remembering, why would he mock Zigong with a lie? The one thread — what is it but extending innate knowledge?

The Changes: the noble person records many former words and past deeds to store up virtue. With storing virtue as the heart, every recording of former words is storing virtue — precisely the work of unity of knowledge and action.

Loving the ancients and earnestly seeking: loving the ancients' learning and keenly seeking this mind's principle. The mind is principle; learning learns this mind; seeking seeks this mind. Mencius: the way of learning is nothing else but seeking the lost mind. Not as later ages, widely reciting the ancients' phrases and calling it love of antiquity while eagerly hunting tools for fame and profit outside.

Broad learning and inquiry — already fully treated.

Warming the old and knowing the new — Zhu Xi himself put warming the old under honoring the moral nature. Can virtue's nature be sought outside? Since knowing the new must come through warming the old, and warming the old is for knowing the new, this too proves knowledge and action no two stages.

Study broadly and expound — in order to return to stating it sparingly. Without that return, what would the broad study and full expounding be for?

Shun's loving to ask and observe was solely to hold to the mean, bringing refinement and unity to bear on the mind of the Way. The mind of the Way is innate knowledge.

The noble person's learning never leaves affairs or discards discourse; but the affairs and discourse he engages in are all the work of knowledge and action united, precisely to extend his mind's innate knowledge — unlike the world's talkers of mouth and ear who split knowledge and action into two things with a real order of stages to recite.

141

来书云:「杨、墨之为仁义,乡愿之乱忠信,尧、舜、子之之禅让[1],汤、武、楚项之放伐[2],周公、莽、操之摄辅[3],谩无印证,又焉适从?且于古今事变、礼乐、名物,未尝考识,使国家欲兴明堂,建辟雍,制历律,草封禅[4],又将何所致其用乎?故《论语》曰『生而知之』者,义理耳。若夫礼乐、名物、古今事变,亦必待学而后有以验其行事之实,此则可谓定论矣。」

所喻杨、墨、乡愿、尧、舜、子之、汤、武、楚项、周公、莽、操之辨,与前舜、武之论,大略可以类推。古今事变之疑,前于良知之说,已有规矩尺度之喻,当亦无俟多赘矣。至于明堂、辟雍诸事,似尚未容于无言者。然其说甚长,姑就吾子之言而取正焉,则吾子之惑将亦可少释矣。

夫明堂、辟雍之制,始见于吕氏之《月令》,汉儒之训疏,《六经》、《四书》之中,未尝详及也。岂吕氏、汉儒之知,乃贤于三代之贤圣乎?齐宣之时,明堂尚有未毁,则幽、厉之世,周之明堂皆无恙也。尧、舜茅茨土阶,明堂之制末必备,而不害其为治;幽、厉之明堂,固犹文、武、成、康之旧,而无救于其乱,何邪?岂能「以不忍人之心,而行不忍人之政」,则虽茅茨土阶,固亦明堂也;以幽、厉之心,而行幽、厉之政,则虽明堂,亦暴政所自出之地邪?武帝肇讲于汉,而武后盛作于唐,其治乱何如邪?

天子之学曰辟雍,诸侯之学曰泮宫,皆象地形而为之名耳[5]。然三代之学,其要皆所以明人伦,非以辟不辟、泮不泮为重轻也。孔子云:「人而不仁,如礼何?人而不仁,如乐何?」制礼作乐,必具中和之德,声为律而身为度者,然后可以语此。若夫器数之末,乐工之事,祝史之守,故曾子曰:「君子所贵乎道者三,笾豆之事,则有司存也。」尧命羲、和,「钦若昊天,历象日月星辰」,其重在于「敬授人时」也。舜「在璇玑玉衡」,其重在于「以齐七政」也。是皆汲汲然以仁民之心而行其养民之政,治历明时之本,固在于此也。

羲、和历数之学,皋、契未必能之也,禹、稷未必能之也,尧、舜之知而不遍物,虽尧、舜亦未必能之也,然至于今循羲、和之法而世修之,虽曲知小慧之人、星术浅陋之士,亦能推步占候而无所忒,则是后世曲知小慧之人,反贤于禹、稷、尧、舜者邪?

「封禅」之说,尤为不经,是乃后世佞人谀士所以求媚于其上,倡为夸侈,以荡君心而靡国费。盖欺天罔人、无耻之大者,君子之所不道,司马相如之所以见讥于天下后世也[6]。吾子乃以是为儒者所宜学,殆亦未之思邪?

夫圣人之所以为圣者,以其生而知之也。而释《论语》者曰:「『生而知之』者,义理耳。若夫礼乐、名物、古今事变,亦必待学而后有以验其行事之实。」夫礼乐、名物之类,果有关于作圣之功也,而圣人亦必待学而后能知焉,则是圣人亦不可以谓之「生知」矣。谓圣人为「生知」者,专指义理而言,而不以礼乐、名物之类,则是礼乐、名物之类无关于作圣之功矣。圣人之所以谓之「生知」者,专指义理而不以礼乐、名物之类;则是「学而知之」者,亦惟当学知此义理而已;「困而知之」者,亦惟当困知此义理而已。今学者之学圣人,于圣人之所能知者,未能「学而知之」,而顾汲汲焉求知圣人之所不能知者以为学,无乃失其所以希圣之方欤?凡此皆就吾子之所惑者而稍为之分释,未及乎拔本塞源之论也。

来信说:「杨朱、墨子的为仁为义,乡愿的乱忠信,尧舜与子之的禅让,汤武与楚项的放伐,周公、王莽、曹操的摄政辅佐,全然没有印证,又何所适从?而且对古今事变、礼乐名物不曾考识,假使国家要兴建明堂、建立辟雍、制历律、草封禅,又将从哪里施展其用呢?所以《论语》说『生而知之』,指的只是义理。至于礼乐名物、古今事变,也必须待学习然后才能验证其行事的实效,这可算是定论了。」

您所举杨墨、乡愿、尧舜、子之、汤武、楚项、周公、莽、操之辨,与前面舜、武之论大略可以类推。古今事变的疑问,前面讲良知之说时已有规矩尺度的比喻,想来也不须多说了。至于明堂、辟雍诸事,似乎还不能不说几句。但其说甚长,姑且就您的话加以论正,您的疑惑也可以稍稍消释。

明堂、辟雍之制,始见于吕氏《月令》和汉儒的训疏,《六经》《四书》之中未曾详及。难道吕氏、汉儒之知竟胜过三代的贤圣吗?齐宣王时,明堂还有未毁的,那么幽厉之世,周的明堂都完好无恙。尧舜住茅屋土阶,明堂之制未必具备,却不妨碍他们天下大治;幽厉的明堂固然还是文武成康的旧物,却救不了他们的乱政,为什么呢?岂不是说,能「以不忍人之心,行不忍人之政」,那么虽茅屋土阶,本来也就是明堂;以幽厉之心行幽厉之政,那么虽是明堂,也只是暴政所出的地方吗?汉武帝肇始于汉讲求,武后在唐代大兴建造,他们的治乱又如何呢?

天子之学叫辟雍,诸侯之学叫泮宫,都只是根据地形起的名字。然而三代之学,其要领都是为了明人伦,并不以辟不辟、泮不泮为轻重。孔子说:「人而不仁,如礼何?人而不仁,如乐何?」制礼作乐,必须具有中和之德、声为律而身为度的人,然后才可以谈这个。至于器物度数之末节,是乐工的事、祝史的职守。所以曾子说:「君子所贵乎道者三,笾豆之事,则有司存。」尧命羲和,「敬顺上天,历象日月星辰」,其重在「敬授人时」。舜「在璇玑玉衡」,其重在「以齐七政」。这都是急切地以仁民之心推行养民之政,治历明时的根本,本来就在这里。

羲和历数之学,皋陶、契未必能,禹、稷未必能。尧舜之知不能遍及万物,虽尧舜也未必能。然而至今沿用羲和之法世代修治,即使小有曲知、星术浅陋之士,也能推步占候而没有差错,难道后世的小慧之人反贤于禹稷尧舜吗?

「封禅」之说尤其荒诞不经,是后世佞人谀士向君主献媚求宠的手段,倡为夸侈之说,动摇君心、靡费国财,是欺天罔人、无耻之大者,君子所不屑谈的,也是司马相如见讥于天下后世的原因。您却以为这是儒者所当学,恐怕是没有深思吧?

圣人之所以为圣,是因为他生而知之。而解《论语》的人说:「『生而知之』,指的只是义理。至于礼乐名物、古今事变,也必须待学而后能验证其行事的实效。」假使礼乐名物之类果真有关作圣之功,而圣人必须待学而后能知,那么圣人也不可称为「生知」了。说圣人是生知,专指义理而不包括礼乐名物,那么礼乐名物就与作圣之功无关了。圣人之所以称为生知,专指义理而不指礼乐名物,那么「学而知之」的,也只应当学知此义理而已;「困而知之」的,也只应当困知此义理而已。如今的学者学圣人,对圣人之所能知的,未能「学而知之」,却急急忙忙去求知道圣人所不能知的东西,作为学问,岂不是失掉了希圣的方法吗?以上都是就您的疑惑稍加分析解释,还没有谈到拔本塞源之论。

Your letter says: 'Yang Zhu's and Mozi's versions of humaneness and rightness, the village-worthy's corruption of loyalty and good faith, the abdications of Yao, Shun and Zizhi, the depositions and campaigns of Tang, Wu, Xiang Yu, the regencies of the Duke of Zhou, Wang Mang and Cao Cao — none with a touchstone to verify: which to follow? And unversed as one is in the changes of past and present, in rites, music, names and things — were the state to raise the Bright Hall, build the Biyong academy, fix the calendar, draft the Feng and Shan sacrifices, where would one's competence show? Hence the Analects' born knowing refers to moral principle only; rites, music, names, things, the changes of history — these await learning to be verified in action. That may stand as the settled conclusion.'

The cases you list can be argued by analogy with the Shun and Wu discussion before; the doubt over historical changes was met by the compass-and-rule figure under innate knowledge. The Bright Hall and academy, however, still call for a word. The matter is long; taking your own words as the target, your perplexity may ease a little.

The Bright Hall and Biyong first appear in Master Lü's Monthly Ordinances and Han commentators' notes; the classics and Four Books barely touch them. Were Lü and the Han scholars wiser than the worthies and sages of the three dynasties? In King Xuan of Qi's day the Bright Hall still stood unbroken; then under You and Li the halls of Zhou were intact — yet useless. Yao and Shun dwelt in thatched huts on earthen steps, the Hall perhaps unbuilt — no bar to their perfect order; You and Li kept the halls of Wen, Wu, Cheng and Kang entire — no rescue from their disorder. Why? Does it not say: with a heart that cannot bear others' suffering, governing with unbearing government, a thatched hut is itself the Bright Hall; with the hearts of You and Li, the Bright Hall is but the chamber where tyranny issues? Emperor Wu began the lectures on it, Empress Wu built it grandly in Tang — what came of their order and disorder?

The Son of Heaven's school is Biyong, the lords' Pan Palace — names taken from the lay of the water. Yet the schools of the three dynasties had as their one aim the illumining of human relations; importance lay not in the ring or half-ring of the walls. Confucius: a person without humaneness — what can ritual do, what can music do? Composing rites and music belongs to those of centered, harmonious virtue, voice itself the pitch-pipe and body the measure. Vessels and numbers are the luthers' business, the invokers' office — hence Zengzi: what the noble person values in the Way is threefold; the dishes and platters have their keepers. Yao charging Xi and He — reverently accord with august heaven, to calendar the sun, moon and stars — its weight lay in reverently granting the people their seasons; Shun at the jade transit — its weight in aligning the seven governings. All this: urgent hearts of loving the people carrying out the rule that nourishes them; the root of calendar and seasons lies there.

The calendrical learning of Xi and He — Gao Yao and Xie could hardly match it, Yu and Ji hardly; Yao and Shun's knowing did not reach all things; yet today, following Xi and He's methods down the generations, even shallow star-gazers compute the ephemerides without error. Are the age's petty clever then worthier than Yu, Ji, Yao and Shun?

The Feng and Shan is the most uncanonical of all — later flatterers' lure to win their sovereign's favor, vaunting extravagance to unsettle the royal mind and waste the state's wealth: deceiving heaven and beguiling men, shamelessness at its largest, what the noble person will not discuss — why Sima Xiangru was scorned by the world and after ages. That you take it for the scholar's proper study — has it been thought through?

The sage is sage through being born knowing. The commentators say born knowing refers to moral principle alone, while rites, music, names and things await learning verified in action. Were those truly of the essence of sage-making, and the sage needed learning to know them, the sage could not be called born knowing. That he is so called, principle alone, excluding rites and things — then those are no part of sage-making; and learning-to-know and hardship-to-know should also concern this principle alone. Today's learners, failing at what the sage could know — learning-to-know it — rush instead to know what the sage could not know, and call it study: have they not lost the very method of hoping for sagehood? All this has only opened your several doubts a little; it has not yet reached the discourse of pulling up the root and stopping the source.

  1. 燕王哙让国于其相子之,三年,国大乱。事见《史记·燕召公世家》。
  2. 项羽初尊楚怀王为义帝,后又放逐义帝并击杀之。事见《史记·项羽本纪》。
  3. 王莽初为汉相,后纂位,事见《汉书·王莽传》。曹操相汉,专权,自诩为周文王,后其子曹丕篡位。事见《三国志·武帝纪》,注引《魏氏春秋》。
  4. 明堂,古代施政行礼之所。辟雍,古代大学所在地。历律,推算音律以定历法。
  5. 辟雍:形圆似圆璧,围以深沟,故名。泮宫:东西门以南通水,北部一半无水,故名。
  6. 司马相如有遗札言封禅,事见《史记·司马相如列传》。
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夫拔本塞源之论不明于天下,则天下之学圣人者,将日繁日难,斯人沦于禽兽、夷狄,而犹自以为圣人之学。

吾之说虽或暂明于一时,终将冻解于西而冰坚于东,雾释于前而云滃于后,呶呶焉危困以死,而卒无救于天下之分毫也已。夫圣人之心,以天地万物为一体,其视天下之人,无外内远近,凡有血气,皆其昆弟赤子之亲,莫不欲安全而教养之,以遂其万物一体之念。

天下之人心,其始亦非有异于圣人也,特其间于有我之私,隔于物欲之蔽,大者以小,通者以塞,人各有心,至有视其父子兄弟如仇雠者。圣人有忧之,是以推其天地万物一体之仁以教天下,使之皆有以克其私、去其蔽,以复其心体之同然。其教之大端,则尧、舜、禹之相授受,所谓「道心惟微,惟精惟一,允执厥中」;而其节目,则舜之命契,所谓「父子有亲,君臣有义,夫妇有别,长幼有序,朋友有信」五者而已。唐、虞、三代之世,教者惟以此为教,而学者惟以此为学。当是之时,人无异见,家无异习,安此者谓之圣,勉此者谓之贤,而背此者虽其启明如朱[1],亦谓之不肖;下至闾井、田野、农、工、商、贾之贱,莫不皆有是学,而惟以成其德行为务。何者?无有闻见之杂,记诵之烦,辞章之靡滥,功利之驰逐,而但使孝其亲,弟其长,信其朋友,以复其心体之同然。是盖性分之所固有,而非有假于外者,则人亦孰不能之乎?

学校之中,惟以成德为事,而才能之异,或有长于礼乐、长于政教、长于水土播植者,则就其成德,而因使益精其能于学校之中。迨夫举德而任,则使之终身居其职而不易。用之者惟知同心一德,以共安天下之民,视才之称否,而不以崇卑为轻重,劳逸为美恶;效用者亦惟知同心一德,以共安天下之民,苟当其能,则终身处于烦剧而不以为劳,安于卑琐而不以为贱。当是之时,天下之人熙熙皞皞,皆相视如一家之亲;其才质之下者,则安其农、工、商、贾之分,各勤其业,以相生相养,而无有乎希高慕外之心。

其才能之异,若皋、夔、稷、契者[2],则出而各效其能。若一家之务,或营其衣食,或通其有无,或备其器用,集谋并力,以求遂其仰事俯育之愿,惟恐当其事者之或怠而重己之累也。故稷勤其稼,而不耻其不知教,视契之善教,即己之善教也;夔司其乐,而不耻于不明礼,视夷[3]之通礼,则己之通礼也。盖其心学纯明,而有以全其万物一体之仁,故其精神流贯,志气通达,而无有乎人己之分、物我之间。譬之一人之身,目视、耳听、手持、足行,以济一身之用。目不耻其无聪,而耳之所涉,目必营焉;足不耻其无执,而手之所探,足必前焉。盖其元气充周,血脉条畅,是以痒疴呼吸,感触神应,有不言而喻之妙。此圣人之学所以至易至简,易知易从,学易能而才易成者,正以大端惟在复心体之同然,而知识技能非所与论也。

拔本塞源之论若不明于天下,则天下学圣人的人,将日益繁杂、日益艰难,人们沦为禽兽夷狄,还自以为是在学圣人之学。

我的学说纵或一时暂明于世,终将像冰在西边消解而在东边又坚冻,雾在眼前散去而云又在后面涌起,我喋喋不休、危困至死,也终究无救于天下分毫。圣人之心,以天地万物为一体,他看天下之人,无论内外远近,凡有血气的,都是他的兄弟赤子之亲,无不想要安全而教养之,以实现其万物一体的念头。

天下的人心,起初也并非与圣人不同,只是中间被有我之私间隔、被物欲之蔽遮隔,大的变小了,通的堵塞了,人各怀私心,甚至有把父子兄弟看作仇敌的。圣人对此深感忧虑,所以推行其天地万物一体之仁来教化天下,使人都能克除私欲、去掉遮蔽,以恢复其心体的同一。其教化的大端,就是尧舜禹相传授的所谓「道心惟微,惟精惟一,允执厥中」;其具体节目,就是舜命契的所谓「父子有亲,君臣有义,夫妇有别,长幼有序,朋友有信」五者而已。唐虞三代之世,教的人只以此为教,学的人只以此为学。在那时,人无异见,家无异习,安于此的称为圣,勉力于此的称为贤,而违背此的即使像朱那样开通明智,也叫作不肖;下至闾井田野的农工商贾之贱,无不都有此学,而只以成就其德行为务。为什么呢?因为没有闻见的杂乱、记诵的烦扰、辞章的靡滥、功利的驰逐,只是使人孝其亲、悌其长、信其朋友,以恢复其心体的同然。这本是人性分中固有的,而非有借于外的,那么人谁不能做到呢?

学校之中,只以成就德行为事。而才能的差异,有的长于礼乐、有的长于政教、有的长于水土播植,就在其成德的基础上,让他在学校中进一步精研其才能。等到举德任用,就让他终身居于其职而不变。任用人的人只知同心一德以共安天下之民,看才干是否相称,而不以职位高低分轻重、以劳逸定美恶;效力的人也只知同心一德以共安天下之民,只要适合自己的才能,就终身处在烦剧之中而不以为劳,安于卑琐而不以为贱。在那时,天下之人熙熙皞皞,都相视如一家之亲;才质低下的人,则安于农工商贾的本分,各勤其业,相生相养,而没有希高慕外之心。

至于才能的差异,如皋陶、夔、稷、契那样的人,就出来各自贡献其才能。就像一家的家务,或经营衣食,或流通有无,或置备器用,集谋并力,以求实现上事父母、下育妻儿的愿望,唯恐担当其事的人懈怠而加重自己的拖累。所以稷勤于稼穑,而不耻于不知教育,看到契善于教育,就如同自己善于教育;夔主管音乐,而不耻于不明礼,看到伯夷通晓礼,就如同自己通礼。因为他们的心学纯明,而能够保全其万物一体之仁,所以精神流贯、志气通达,而没有人己之分、物我之隔。譬如一个人的身体,眼睛看、耳朵听、手拿、脚走,以供一身的用处。眼睛不耻于没有听觉,而耳朵所涉及的,眼睛必关注;脚不耻于不能拿东西,而手所探取的,脚必向前。因为元气充周、血脉条畅,所以痒痛呼吸、感触神应,有不言而喻的妙处。圣人之学之所以至易至简、易知易从、学易能而才易成,正因为其大端只在恢复心体之同然,而知识技能不是所讨论的。

If the discourse of pulling up the root and stopping the source is not made clear to the world, then those under heaven who study the sage will find it daily more tangled and hard; men will sink to beasts and barbarians while flattering themselves students of the sage.

My doctrine, though lit for a moment, would thaw in the west while freezing hard in the east, the mist lift before while clouds boil up behind; I should clamor myself into peril and death with never a hair's help to the world. The sage's heart takes heaven, earth and the ten thousand things as one body: all under heaven, inner or outer, near or far, whatever has blood and breath are his brothers and infant children; there is none he does not wish to keep safe and to teach and nourish, fulfilling the thought of all-things-as-one-body.

The hearts of men under heaven were at first no different from the sage's; only the private self came between, the screen of thing-desire closed over, the great grew small, the open was dammed; each heart its own, till fathers and sons, brothers, face each other as foes. The sage grieved at this, and so spread abroad the humaneness of heaven-earth-things-as-one to teach the world, that all might master their selfishness, strip their veils, and recover the sameness of the mind's substance. The great heads of that teaching are what Yao, Shun and Yu handed one another — the mind of the Way is subtle; refinement and unity alone; hold fast the Mean. Its working items are Shun's charge to Xie: between father and son affection, ruler and minister duty, husband and wife distinction, old and young order, friends good faith — five, no more. Through Tang, Yu and the three dynasties, teachers taught only this, learners learned only this. Then no man held a different view, no house a different practice: at home in this was called sage, striving toward it worthy; turning from it, though open-browed and bright like Zhu, was called unworthy; down to the lanes and fields, farmer, artisan, trader — all had this learning, single-minded on perfecting their virtue. Why? No medley of hearsay, no drudgery of recital, no flood of fine writing, no chase of profit — only being filial to parents, respectful to elders, faithful to friends, recovering the sameness of the mind's substance. This is native to one's nature and borrowed from nothing outside — who then could not do it?

In the schools only the perfecting of virtue was the business. Differences of talent — one strong in rites and music, one in governance and teaching, one in water, soil and sowing — were, upon that virtue, honed finer within the schools. When virtue raised a man to office, he held that office for life, unchanged. Those who employed knew only single heart and shared virtue to give the people peace together, weighing fitness of talent, not ranking by loftiness of post, calling ease fair and toil foul. Those who served knew only single heart and shared virtue; if it fit their powers, they dwelt all their lives in burdensome office and read it not as toil, in humble detail and read it not as mean. Then the people under heaven, easy and open, looked upon one another as one family's kin. Those of lesser endowment kept contentedly to the farmer's, artisan's, trader's lot, each diligent at his trade, birthing and nourishing one another, with no hankering after heights beyond.

The differences of talent — such as Gao Yao, Kui, Ji, Xie — came forth each to yield his powers. As in one household's affairs: some see to food and clothes, some trade surplus and want, some furnish the tools, planning together, pulling together, to fulfill the hopes of serving those above and rearing those below, each fearing lest the one in charge slacken and double his own burden. So Ji toiled at the grain and was not ashamed not to know teaching: Xie's skill in teaching was his own; Kui kept the music and was not ashamed not to master ritual: Yi's mastery of ritual was his own. Their learning of the heart was pure and bright, whole in the humaneness of all-things-as-one-body; spirit streamed through, will and breath ran free, with no division of self and other, no wall between thing and me. As in one body: the eye sees, the ear hears, the hand grasps, the foot walks, each serving the body's use. The eye is not ashamed to lack hearing — what the ear engages, the eye attends; the foot is not ashamed to grasp nothing — where the hand reaches, the foot steps first. The primal breath fills and circles, the blood-channels run clean, so itch and pain, breath and touch answer as if by spirit — a fitness past telling. Hence the sages' learning is utterly easy, utterly simple, easy to know and follow, easy to learn and to grow able in: its one great head is recovering the sameness of the mind's substance — knowledge and skill are no part of the question.

  1. 朱:丹朱,尧之子。
  2. 四人皆舜臣,皋陶为掌刑法之官,夔为典乐之官,稷为掌农事之官,契为教育之官,事见《尚书·舜典》。
  3. 夷:伯夷,舜臣,掌礼之官。
143

三代之衰,王道熄而霸术焻;孔、孟既没,圣学晦而邪说横。教者不复以此为教,而学者不复以此为学。霸者之徒,窃取先王之近似者,假之于外以内济其私己之欲,天下靡然而[1]宗之,圣人之道遂以芜塞。相仿相效,日求所以富强之说、倾诈之谋、攻伐之计,一切欺天罔人,苟一时之得,以猎取声利之术,若管、商、苏、张[2]之属者,至不可名数。

既其久也,鬬争劫夺,不胜其祸,斯人沦于禽兽、夷狄,而霸术亦有所不能行矣。世之儒者慨然悲伤,搜腊先圣王之典草法制,而掇拾修补于煨烬之余,盖其为心,良亦欲以挽回先王之道。圣学既远,霸术之传,积渍已深,虽在贤知,皆不免于习染,其所以讲明修饰,以求宣畅光复于世者,仅足以增霸者之藩篱,而圣学之门墙,遂不复可睹。于是乎有训诂之学,而传之以为名;有记诵之学,而言之以为博;有词章之学,而侈之以为丽。若是者,纷纷籍籍,群起角立于天下,又不知其几家,万径千蹊,莫知所适。

世之学者如人百戏之场,讙谑跳踉,骋奇鬬巧,献笑争妍者,四面而竞出,前瞻后盼,应接不遑,而耳目眩瞀,精神恍惑,日夜遨游淹息其间,如病狂丧心之人,莫自知其家业之所归。时君世主亦皆昏迷颠倒于其说,而终身从事于无用之虚文,莫自知其所谓。间有觉其空疏谬妄、支离牵滞,而卓然自奋,欲以见诸行事之实者,极其所抵,亦不过为富强功利、五霸之事业而止。圣人之学日远日晦,而功利之习愈趋愈下。其间虽尝瞽惑于佛、老,而佛、老之说卒亦未能有以胜其功利之心;虽又尝折衷于群儒,而群儒之论终亦未能有以破其功利之见。

盖至于今,功利之毒沦浃于人之心髓,而习以成性也几千年矣。相矜以知,相轧以势,相争以利,相高以技能,相取以声誉。其出而仕也,理钱榖者则欲兼夫兵刑,典礼乐者又欲与于铨轴,处郡县则思藩臬之高,居台谏则望宰执之要[3]。故不能其事,则不得以兼其官;不通其说,则不可以要其誉;记诵之广,适以长其敖也;知识之多,适以行其恶也;闻见之博,适以肆其辨也;辞章之富,适以饰其伪也。是以皋、夔、稷、契所不能兼之事,而今之初学小生皆欲通其说,究其术。其称名僭号,未尝不曰「吾欲以共成天下之务」,而其诚心实意之所在,以为不如是则无以济其私而满其欲也。

呜呼!以若是之积染,以若是之心志,而又讲之以若是之学术,宜其闻吾圣人之教,而视之以为赘疣枘凿,则其以良知为未足,而谓圣人之学为无所用,亦其势有所必至矣!呜呼!士生斯世,而尚何以求圣人之学乎?尚何以论圣人之学乎?士生斯世,而欲以为学者,不亦劳苦而繁难乎?不亦拘滞而险艰乎!呜呼,可悲也已!

所幸天理之在人心,终有所不可泯,而良知之明,万古一日,则其闻吾拔本塞源之论,必有恻然而悲,戚然而痛,愤然而起,沛然若决江河,而有所不可御者矣。非夫豪杰之士,无所待而兴起者,吾谁与望乎?

(此条自第八段「夫拔本塞源之论不明于天下」起,陈龙正曾单独选出刻行,标明为「拔本塞源论」,系王守仁之最著名之论著之一,代表他之伦理思想。)

三代衰落,王道熄灭而霸术昌盛。孔孟死后,圣学晦暗而邪说横行。教的人不再以此为教,学的人不再以此为学。霸者之徒,窃取先王之术中表面相似的东西,假借于外以谋济其私欲,天下风靡而追随,圣人之道于是荒芜阻塞。人们互相仿效,天天追求富强之说、倾诈之谋、攻伐之计,一切欺天罔人、苟得一时的手段,以猎取声名利禄的权术,像管仲、商鞅、苏秦、张仪之流,多到数不清。

久而久之,斗争劫夺,祸乱无穷,人们沦为禽兽夷狄,而霸术也行不下去了。世上的儒者慨然悲伤,搜猎先圣王的典章法制,在焚毁的余烬中掇拾修补。他们的用心,也确实是想挽回先王之道。但圣学久远,霸术之传浸渍已深,即使是贤智之人,也难免习染。他们讲求修饰以求宣扬光复于世的,恰恰只足以给霸者增加藩篱,而圣学的门墙,就再也看不见了。于是有训诂之学,借以显名;有记诵之学,借以夸博;有词章之学,借以炫丽。诸如此类,纷纷籍籍,群起并立于天下,又不知有几家;万径千蹊,使人不知所从。

世上的学者如同置身百戏之场,欢谑跳踉、骋奇斗巧、献笑争妍的,从四面竞相涌出;前瞻后盼,应接不暇,耳目眩晕,精神恍惚,日夜遨游息歇于其间,如同病狂丧心之人,不知道自己家的产业在哪里。当时的君主世主也都昏迷颠倒于这些学说之中,终身从事于无用的虚文,自己也不知道所谓何来。其间偶有觉察其空疏谬妄、支离牵滞,而卓然奋发、想见诸行事之实的人,达到顶点,也不过做出富强功利、五霸的事业为止。圣人之学日远日晦,而功利之习愈趋愈下。其间虽曾迷惑于佛老,但佛老之说终究也未能胜过其功利之心;虽又曾折衷于诸儒,但诸儒之论终究也未能破其功利之见。

直到今天,功利之毒已浸透人心髓,习以成性几乎千年了。人们以知互相夸耀,以势互相倾轧,以利互相争夺,以技能互相标榜,以声誉互相摄取。出仕为官的,管钱谷的想兼管兵刑,典礼乐的又想插手铨选;做郡县官的想着藩臬的高位,居台谏的望着宰执的要职。所以不能其事,就不能兼其官;不通其说,就不能邀其誉;记诵之广,恰足以长其傲慢;知识之多,恰足以行其恶;闻见之博,恰足以肆其诡辩;辞章之富,恰足以饰其虚伪。所以皋、夔、稷、契所不能兼的事,而如今后学小生都想通其说、究其术。他们称名借号,未尝不说「我要共成天下之务」,而其诚心实意所在,是认为不这样就无以济其私而满其欲。

唉!以这样的积染,这样的心志,又讲之以这样的学术,难怪他们听到我圣人之教,就看作赘疣凿枘;那么他们以为良知不足恃、说圣人之学无所可用,也是势必至此的了!唉!士人生在这样的时代,还能怎样求圣人之学呢?还能怎样论圣人之学呢?士人生在这样的时代而想为学,不也太劳苦繁难了吗?不也太拘滞险艰了吗!唉,可悲啊!

所幸天理之在人心,终究有不可泯灭之处,而良知之明,万古如一日。那么他们听到我这拔本塞源之论,必有恻然而悲、戚然而痛、奋然而起,其势沛然如同江河决堤而不可阻挡的了。不是那种无所等待而奋起的豪杰之士,我又能指望谁呢?

(此条后半「夫拔本塞源之论不明于天下」起,陈龙正曾单独选出刻行,题为「拔本塞源论」,是王守仁最著名的论著之一,代表其伦理思想。)

With the three dynasties' decline, the royal Way guttered and the arts of hegemony blazed; after Confucius and Mencius, the sagely learning darkened and strange doctrines ran wild. Teachers no longer taught it, learners no longer learned it. The hegemons' followers stole the outward likeness of the former kings, borrowed it from without to serve their private lusts within; the world swept after them, and the sages' Way grew waste and blocked. Imitation bred imitation; day upon day men sought the schemes of wealth and power, the plots of deceit, the plans of conquest — everything that cheats heaven and beguiles men for an hour's gain, the arts of hunting fame and profit — Guan Zhong, Shang Yang, Su Qin, Zhang Yi and their kind past counting.

Long years of it: strife and plunder, calamity past enduring; men sank to beasts and barbarians, and even hegemony could no longer run. The world's scholars, grieving, hunted the old sage-kings' statutes and gleaned and patched among the embers. Their hearts truly meant to win back the former kings' Way. But the sagely learning was far away, the hegemonic tradition soaked deep; even the worthy and wise could not escape the dye. What they polished and set forth to brighten and restore served only to raise the hegemon's fences higher, till the very gate and wall of the sagely learning could no longer be seen. Then arose the learning of glosses, to make a name; the learning of recital, to pass for breadth; the learning of fine writing, to shine. Such schools, thick as driftwood, stood contending across the world past counting; ten thousand paths, a thousand byways, none knowing which to walk.

The world's learners were like crowds in a circus of a hundred feats: jesters leaping, wonders vying, smiles and graces offered on every side; looking before and behind, no time to answer, eyes dazzled, wits lost, wandering day and night in the din like men mad and heart-struck, unknowing where their own household's estate has gone. The rulers of the age too lay bemused and topsy-turvy in these doctrines, lifelong at useless paper-work, unknowing what for. Here and there one saw the emptiness, the wild error, the fragment and tangle, and rose towering to put it into solid deed — yet at the summit attained nothing beyond the wealth-and-power, five-hegemons enterprise. The sages' learning receded daily darker, the habit of profit sank daily lower. Men dabbled in Buddha and Laozi, yet those teachings never beat their profit-loving hearts; they sought a mean among the scholars, yet the scholars' arguments never broke their profit-loving views.

To this day the poison of profit has soaked to the marrow of men's hearts, habit become second nature these thousand years: boasting knowledge against each other, crushing with power, scrambling for gain, vying in skill, fishing for repute. In office, the granary hand covets arms and justice too, the rites-and-music man fingers the appointments; a county magistrate dreams the provincial heights, the censorate eyes the chancellor's keys. Unable at the task, yet not foregoing the title; unversed in the doctrine, yet not forgoing the praise. Breadth of recital but feeds arrogance; plenty of knowledge but serves the doing of ill; width of hearsay but looses the tongue; richness of phrase but gilds the lie. What Gao, Kui, Ji and Xie could not combine, today's callow students all mean to master and expound. Their styling and slogans never fail to say: to share in completing the world's work — while the true bent of their hearts holds that without this they cannot slake their private thirst.

Alas! With such accretions, such hearts, taught by such learning — small wonder they hear a sage's teaching and see wens and buckled tenons; that they deem innate knowledge insufficient and the sages' learning useless — the momentum could lead nowhere else! Alas! A scholar born into such an age — how shall he seek the sages' learning? How speak of it? A scholar born into such an age who yet would learn: is it not toil and tangle? Is it not straitness and peril! Alas, sorrow indeed!

Yet heaven's principle in the human heart can never be wholly drowned; the light of innate knowledge is one through ten thousand ages. Let men but hear this discourse of pulling up the root and stopping the source: there will be those who ache and grieve, wound and pain, rise up in wrath, flood forth like rivers burst from their banks, past all damming. If not the heroic, who rise awaiting nothing — whom else could I look to?

(The latter half of this entry, from 'if the discourse of pulling up the root and stopping the source is not made clear,' was separately printed by Chen Longzheng under the title 'Discourse on Pulling Up the Root' — one of Wang Yangming's most famous writings, embodying his ethical thought.)

  1. 施本、俞本,无「而」字。
  2. 管:管仲,春秋时齐国宰相,法家。商:商鞅,战国时秦国宰相,法家。苏:苏秦,战国时纵横家。张:张仪,战国时纵横家。
  3. 理钱谷,指户部的财政工作。典礼乐,指礼部及太常卿的礼仪工作。铨轴,指吏部的铨敍工作。藩臬,藩指一省最高负责官吏的藩司,臬指巡视各省的臬使。台谏,御史台与谏议。宰执,宰相执政。
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