传习录

155

来书云:「良知,心之本体,即所谓性善也,未发之中也,寂然不动之体也,廓然大公也,何常人皆不能而必待于学耶?中也,寂也,公也,既以属心之体,则良知是矣。今验之于心,知无不良;而中、寂、大公,实未有也。岂良知复超然于体、用之外乎?」

性无不善,故知无不良;良知即是未发之中,即是廓然大公、寂然不动之本体,人人之所同具者也。但不能不昏蔽于物欲,故须学以去其昏蔽;然于良知之本体,初不能有加损于毫末也。知无不良,而中、寂、大公,未能全者,是昏蔽之未尽去,而存之未纯耳。体既良知之体,用即良知之用,宁复有「超然于体、用之外」者乎?

来信说:「良知是心的本体,就是所谓的性善、未发之中、寂然不动之体、廓然大公,为什么常人都不能做到而必须待学呢?中、寂、公既然属于心之体,那就是良知了。如今在心上验证,知没有不良的,而中、寂、大公实在未曾有。莫非良知竟超然于体用之外吗?」

性无不善,所以知无不良。良知就是未发之中,就是廓然大公、寂然不动的本体,是人人共同具有的。只是不能不被物欲昏蔽,所以必须通过学以去除昏蔽;然而对于良知的本体,本来不能有分毫的增损。知无不良而中、寂、大公未能完全的,是昏蔽未曾去尽、存养未曾纯熟罢了。体既是良知之体,用就是良知之用,难道还有「超然于体用之外」的东西吗?

Your letter says: 'Innate knowledge is the mind's substance — nature-good, the equilibrium before arousal, the still unmoving substance, vast impartiality. Why can no ordinary person do it, that learning is required? If equilibrium, stillness and impartiality belong to the mind's substance, they are innate knowledge. Testing on my mind: the knowing is never not good; yet equilibrium, stillness and vast impartiality are truly not there. Does innate knowledge then stand outside substance and function?'

Nature being never not good, the knowing is never not good. Innate knowledge is the equilibrium before arousal, the vast impartial still unmoving substance, commonly possessed by all. Only, it cannot escape dimming by thing-desire, hence learning to strip the dimming; yet of innate knowledge's own substance not a hair can be added or taken. Knowing never not good, while equilibrium, stillness and impartiality are incomplete — the dimming not all removed, the preserving not yet pure. The substance being innate knowledge's substance, the function is innate knowledge's function — what room for anything outside substance and function?

156

来书云:「周子曰『主静』,程子曰『动亦定,静亦定』,先生曰「定者心之本体」。是静定也,决非不睹不闻,无思无为之谓,必常知常存,常主于理之谓也。夫常知常存,常主于理,明是动也,已发也,何以谓之静?何以谓之本体?岂是静定也,又有以贯乎心之动静者邪?」

理无动者也。常知常存,常主于理,即不睹不闻、无思无为之谓也。不睹不闻、无思无为,非槁木死灰之谓也;睹闻思为一于理,而未尝有所睹闻思为,即是动而未尝动也。所谓「动亦定,静亦定」、「体用一原」者也。

来信说:「周敦颐说『主静』,程子说『动亦定,静亦定』,先生说『定者心之本体』。那么这个静定,决不是不睹不闻、无思无为的意思,必定是常知常存、常主于理的意思。常知常存、常主于理,明明是动、是已发,为什么叫作静?为什么叫作本体?莫非静定之外,还有个贯通心之动静的东西吗?」

理是不动的。常知常存、常主于理,就是不睹不闻、无思无为的意思。不睹不闻、无思无为,并不是槁木死灰;睹闻思为一于理,而未尝有所睹闻思为,就是动而未尝动。这就是所谓「动亦定,静亦定」「体用一原」。

Your letter says: 'Zhou said abide in stillness; Cheng said settled in movement, settled in stillness; you say settledness is the mind's substance. This still-settledness is surely not not-seeing, not-hearing, no-thought, no-doing; it must be ever-knowing, ever-preserving, ever-abiding in principle. Ever-knowing and abiding is plainly movement, already-aroused — why call it still? Why the original substance? Does something beyond stillness thread through the mind's movement and rest?'

Principle does not move. Ever-knowing, ever-preserving, ever-abiding in principle is precisely not-seeing, not-hearing, no-thought, no-doing. That is not withered wood and cold ashes: seeing, hearing, thinking, doing at one with principle, yet never really seeing, hearing, thinking, doing — moving, yet never moved. That is settled in movement, settled in stillness, substance and function one source.

157

来书云:「此心未发之体,其在已发之前乎?其在已发之中而为之主乎?其无前后、内外而浑然之体者乎?今谓心之动、静者,其主有事、无事而言乎?其主寂然、感通而言乎?其主循理、从欲而言乎?若以循理为静,从欲为动,则于所谓『动中有静,静中有动,动极而静,静极而动』者,不可通矣。若以有事而感通为动,无事而寂然为静,则于所谓『动而无动,静而无静』者,不可通矣。若谓未发在已发之先,静而生动,是至诚有息也,圣人有复也,又不可矣。若谓未发在已发之中,则不知未发、已发俱当主静乎?抑未发为静而已发为动乎?抑未发、已发俱无动无静乎?俱有动有静乎?幸教。」

未发之中,即良知也,无前后内外,而浑然一体者也。有事、无事可以言动、静,而良知无分于有事、无事也;寂然、感通可以言动、静,而良知无分于寂然、感通也。动、静者,所遇之时;心之本体,固无分于动、静也。理无动者也,动即为欲。循理则虽酬酢万变而未尝动也,从欲则虽槁心一念而未尝静也。「动中有静,静中有动」,又何疑乎?有事而感通,固可以言动,然而寂然者未尝有增也;无事而寂然,固可以言静,然而感通者未尝有减也。「动而无动,静而无静」,又何疑乎?无前后内外而浑然一体,则至诚有息之疑,不待解矣。未发在已发之中,而已发之中未尝别有未发者在,已发在未发之中,而未发之中未尝别有已发者存。是未尝无动、静,而不可以动、静分者也。

凡观古人言语,在以意逆志而得其大旨,若必拘滞于文义,则「靡有孑遗」者,是周果无遗民也。周子「静极而动」之说,苟不善观,亦未免有病。盖其意从「太极动而生阳,静而生阴」说来。太极生生之理,妙用无息,而常体不易。太极之生生,即阴阳之生生。就其生生之中,指其妙用无息者而谓之动,谓之阳之生,非谓动而徒生阳也,就其生生之中,指其常体不易者而谓之静,谓之阴之生,非谓静而后生阴也。若果静而后生阴,动而后生阳,则是阴阳、动静,截然各自为一物矣。阴阳一气也,一气屈伸而为阴阳;动静一理也,一理隐显而为动、静。春夏可以为阳、为动,而未尝无阴与静也;秋冬可以为阴、为静,而未尝无阳与动也。春夏此不息,秋冬此不息,皆可谓之阳,谓之动也;春夏此常体,秋冬此常体,皆可谓之阴,谓之静也。自元、会、运、世、岁、月、日、时,以至刻、杪、忽、微,莫不皆然。所谓动静无端,阴阳无始,在知道者默而识之,非可以言语穷也。若只牵文泥句,比拟仿像,则所谓心从《法华》转,非是转《法华》矣。

来信说:「此心未发之体,是在已发之前呢?还是在已发之中作主宰呢?还是无前后内外、浑然一体呢?如今说心的动静,是就有事无事说的呢?是就寂然感通说的呢?还是就循理从欲说的呢?若以循理为静、从欲为动,那么对所谓『动中有静,静中有动,动极而静,静极而动』,就讲不通了。若以有事感通为动、无事寂然为静,那么对所谓『动而无动,静而无静』,就讲不通了。若说未发在已发之先,静而生动,那至诚就有息的时候、圣人也有复的时候,又不对了。若说未发在已发之中,那么不知未发已发都主静呢,还是未发为静而已发为动呢,还是都无动无静、都有动有静呢?请赐教。」

未发之中就是良知,无前后内外,浑然一体。有事无事可以说动静,而良知不分有事无事;寂然感通可以说动静,而良知不分寂然感通。动静是所遭遇的时机,心的本体本不分动静。理是不动的,动就是欲。循理则虽酬酢万变而未尝动;从欲则虽槁心一念而未尝静。「动中有静,静中有动」,又有什么可疑?有事感通固然可以说是动,然而寂然者未尝有所增;无事寂然固然可以说是静,然而感通者未尝有所减。「动而无动,静而无静」,又有什么可疑?无前后内外而浑然一体,那么至诚有息的疑问,就不待解了。未发在已发之中,而已发之中未尝另有个未发在;已发在未发之中,而未发之中未尝另有个已发存。这是未尝无动静,而不可以动静来分的。

凡看古人的言语,在于以意逆志而得其大旨;若必拘泥于文义,那么「靡有孑遗」就是周朝果真没有遗民了。周子「静极而动」之说,若不善于看,也未免有毛病。它的意思是从「太极动而生阳,静而生阴」来的。太极生生之理,妙用无息,而常体不易。太极的生生,就是阴阳的生生。就其生生之中,指出那妙用无息的叫作动、叫作阳之生,不是说动而后才生出阳;就其生生之中,指出那常体不易的叫作静、叫作阴之生,不是说静而后才生出阴。若果真是静而后生阴、动而后生阳,那阴阳动静就截然各自为一物了。阴阳本是一气,一气屈伸而为阴阳;动静本是一理,一理隐显而为动静。春夏可以为阳、为动,但未尝没有阴与静;秋冬可以为阴、为静,但未尝没有阳与动。春夏此不息,秋冬此不息,都可以叫阳、叫动;春夏此常体,秋冬此常体,都可以叫阴、叫静。从元、会、运、世、岁、月、日、时,直到刻、杪、忽、微,无不如此。所谓动静无端、阴阳无始,懂道的人默而识之,不是言语所能穷尽的。若只牵文泥句、比拟仿像,那就是所谓心被《法华》转,而不是转《法华》了。

Your letter says: 'This mind's not-yet-aroused substance — before the already-aroused? Or amid the aroused as their master? Or without before-or-after, inner-or-outer, one seamless whole? And when we say movement and stillness, is it of having-affairs or none? Of stillness-versus-penetrating-response? Of following principle or following desire? If following principle is stillness and desire movement, then movement holding stillness, stillness holding movement, movement at extremity passing into stillness and stillness into movement will not parse. If responding amid affairs is movement and quiet without affairs stillness, then moving yet not moving, still yet not still will not parse. If the not-yet-aroused precedes the aroused, stillness begetting movement, then utmost sincerity has cessation and the sage a recovering — wrong again. If the not-yet-aroused lies within the aroused, do both abide in stillness? Or is the not-yet-aroused still and the aroused moving? Or neither moving nor still, or both? Pray instruct.'

The equilibrium before arousal is innate knowledge: no before-or-after, inner-or-outer, one seamless whole. With-affairs and without can be called moving and still; innate knowledge divides not between them. Stillness and penetrating-response can be called moving and still; innate knowledge divides not between them. Movement and stillness are the times one meets; the mind's substance divides not between them. Principle does not move; to move is desire. Following principle, one engages ten thousand changes yet never moves; following desire, one sits in dead quiet with a single thought yet never is still. Movement holding stillness, stillness holding movement — where is the doubt? Response amid affairs may be called movement, yet the still is never thereby augmented; quiet without affairs may be called stillness, yet the responding is never thereby diminished. Moving yet not moving, still yet not still — where is the doubt? No before-or-after, one seamless whole: the doubt over utmost sincerity's ceasing dissolves unbidden. The not-yet-aroused is within the aroused, yet the aroused never harbor a separate not-yet-aroused; the aroused are within the not-yet-aroused, yet the not-yet-aroused never store a separate aroused. There is never lack of movement and stillness — but they cannot be cut apart by movement and stillness.

In reading the ancients, meet the intent and take the great purport; cleave to the letter and no man left would mean Zhou truly had no survivors. Zhou's stillness-at-extremity-begetting-movement, badly read, is also faulty. It comes from the Great Ultimate moving begets yang, still begets yin. The Ultimate's life-begetting principle, wondrous-working without rest, its constant substance unchanging. The Ultimate's life-begetting is yin-and-yang's life-begetting. Within that life-begetting, pointing to the wondrous unresting, call it movement, yang's birth — not that movement then births yang; pointing to the constant unchanging, call it stillness, yin's birth — not that stillness then births yin. Were yin truly born after stillness and yang after movement, yin-yang, movement-stillness would be two things cut apart. Yin and yang are one breath, one breath folding and stretching into yin and yang; movement and stillness are one principle, one principle hiding and showing as movement and stillness. Spring and summer may be yang and movement, yet never lack yin and stillness; autumn and winter yin and stillness, yet never lack yang and movement. The unresting of spring-summer and of autumn-winter may all be called yang, called movement; the constant substance of both may all be called yin, called stillness. From aeon, epoch, cycle and age down through year, month, day and hour to the mark, the moment, the flicker, the mote — all is so. Movement and stillness without beginning, yin and yang without start: who knows the Way holds it silently — words cannot exhaust it. Tug at phrases and copy likenesses, and it is the mind turned by the Lotus Sutra, not turning the Lotus.

158

来书云:「尝试于心,喜、怒、忧、惧之感发也,虽动气之极,而吾心良知一觉,即罔然消阻,或遏于初,或制于中,或悔于后。然则良知常若居优闲无事之地而为之主,于喜、怒、忧、惧若不与焉者,何欤?」

知此,则知未发之中、寂然不动之体,而有发而中节之和、感而遂通之妙矣。然谓「良知常若居于优闲无事之地」,语尚有病。盖良知虽不滞于喜、怒、忧、惧,而喜、怒、忧、惧亦不外于良知也。

来信说:「我曾试着在心上体察:喜、怒、忧、惧的感发,即使动气到极点,而我心良知一觉,便茫然消阻,或在初起时遏止,或在中间制服,或在事后悔悟。那么良知常像处在悠闲无事之地作主宰,对喜、怒、忧、惧似乎不参与,这是为什么呢?」

知道这个,就知道未发之中、寂然不动的本体,而有发而中节之和、感而遂通之妙了。但说「良知常像居于悠闲无事之地」,这话还有毛病。良知虽不滞于喜、怒、忧、惧,而喜、怒、忧、惧也不外于良知。

Your letter says: 'Testing on my mind: joy, anger, worry, fear may flare to the utmost, yet one awakening of innate knowledge and they melt away — checked at the first, mastered midway, repented after. So innate knowledge seems to preside from some place of idle leisure, uninvolved in joy, anger, worry and fear. Why is that?'

Know this, and you know the equilibrium before arousal, the still unmoving substance, with the harmony of due-measure and the marvel of stirred-and-penetrating. But to say innate knowledge dwells apart in leisure is still faulty language. Though innate knowledge is not lodged in joy, anger, worry and fear, joy, anger, worry and fear are not outside innate knowledge.

159

来书云:「夫子昨以良知为照心。窃谓良知,心之本体也,照心,人所用[1]功,乃戒慎恐催之心也,犹思也,而遂以戒慎恐催为良知,何欤?」

能戒慎恐惧者,是良知也。

来信说:「先生昨日以良知为照心。我以为良知是心的本体,照心是人所用功夫,是戒慎恐惧之心,如同思一样;却把戒慎恐惧当作良知,为什么呢?」

能戒慎恐惧的,就是良知。

Your letter says: 'Yesterday you made innate knowledge the mirroring mind. I should have thought innate knowledge the mind's substance, the mirroring mind the work man applies — the vigilant, fearful mind, as it were a thinking; why then make vigilance and fear innate knowledge?'

That which can be vigilant and fearful is innate knowledge.

  1. 「用功」二字之间,施本、俞本并有「之」字。
160

来书云:「先生又曰:『照心非动也。』岂以其循理而谓之静欤?『妄心亦照也。』岂以其良知未尝不在于其中,未尝不明于其中,而视听言动之不过则者,皆天理欤?且既曰妄心,则在妄心可谓之照,而在照心则谓之妄矣。妄与息何异?今假妄之照以续至诚之无息,窃所未明,幸再启蒙。」

「照心非动」者,以其发于本体明觉之自然,而未尝有所动也;有所动即妄矣。「妄心亦照」者,以其本体明觉之自然者,未尝不在于其中,但有所动耳;无所动即照矣。无妄、无照,非以妄为照、以照为妄也。照心为照,妄心为妄,是犹有妄、有照也。有妄、有照,则犹贰也,贰则息矣。无妄、无照则不贰,不贰则不息矣。

来信说:「先生又说:『照心非动也』,岂是因为它循理而称之为静?『妄心亦照也』,岂是因为良知未尝不在其中、未尝不明于其中,而视听言动的合乎准则者都是天理?但既然叫妄心,那么在妄心可称之为照,而在照心就该称之为妄了。妄与息有什么不同?如今借妄心之照来接续至诚的无息,我不明白,请再启蒙。」

「照心非动」,是因为它发自本体明觉的自然,未尝有所动;有所动便是妄了。「妄心亦照」,是因为本体的自然明觉未尝不在其中,只是有所动罢了;无所动便是照了。无妄无照,并不是以妄为照、以照为妄。照心为照、妄心为妄,就还有妄、有照;有妄有照,就还是贰;贰就息了。无妄无照则不贰,不贰就不息。

Your letter says: 'You say the mirroring mind does not move — is it called still because it follows principle? And the deluded mind also mirrors — is it because innate knowledge is never absent or unlit within it, so that seeing, hearing, speech and action within the norm are all heavenly principle? But if it is called deluded, then in the deluded mind it may be called mirroring, and in the mirroring mind, deluded. How does delusion differ from cessation? Borrowing the deluded mind's mirroring to continue utmost sincerity's unceasing — I do not understand; instruct me again.'

The mirroring mind does not move: it issues from the natural bright awareness of the substance, never moved; once moved, it is delusion. The deluded mind also mirrors: the substance's natural bright awareness is never absent within it, only there is movement; without movement it is mirroring. No-delusion, no-mirroring does not mean taking delusion as mirroring or mirroring as delusion. Mirroring as mirroring and delusion as delusion still leaves delusion and mirroring present; present, there is doubleness; doubled, it ceases. No-delusion, no-mirroring is undoubled; undoubled, unceasing.

161

来书云:「养生以清心寡欲为要。夫清心寡欲,作圣之功毕矣。然欲寡则心自清。清心非舍弃人事而独居求静之谓也。盖欲使此心纯乎天理,而无一毫人欲之私耳。今欲为此之功,而随人欲生而克之,则病根常在,未危灭于东而生于西。若欲刊剥洗荡于众欲未萌之先,则又无所用其力,徒使此心之不清。且欲未萌而搜剔以求去之,是犹引犬上堂而逐之也,愈不可矣。」

必欲此心纯乎天理,而无一毫人欲之私,此作圣之功也。必欲此心纯乎天理,而无一毫人欲之私,非防于未萌之先而克于方萌之际不能也。防于未萌之先而克于方萌之际,此正《中庸》「戒慎恐惧」、《大学》「致知格物」之功,舍此之外,无别功矣。

夫谓灭于东而生于西,引犬上堂而逐之者,是自私自利,将迎意必之为累,而非克治洗荡之为患也。今曰「养生以清心寡欲为要」,只「养生」二字,便是自私自利、将迎意必之根。有此病根潜伏于中,宜其有「灭于东而生于西」、「引犬上堂而逐之」之患也。

来信说:「养生以清心寡欲为要。清心寡欲,作圣的功夫也就完备了。然而欲寡则心自清。清心并不是舍弃人事而独居求静的意思,是要使此心纯乎天理、没有一毫人欲之私罢了。如今要做这个功夫,随着人欲生起便去克治,那么病根常在,扑灭于东而生于西。若想在众欲未萌之先就把它扫荡干净,又无处用力,徒使此心不清。而且欲念未萌却去搜剔以求去掉它,这就像把狗引上堂再来赶它,越发不行了。」

必欲此心纯乎天理、无一毫人欲之私,这正是作圣的功夫。必欲此心纯乎天理,非在未萌之先防范、在方萌之际克治不可。防于未萌之先而克于方萌之际,这正是《中庸》「戒慎恐惧」、《大学》「致知格物」的功夫,除此以外没有别的功夫。

至于说「灭于东而生于西」「引犬上堂而逐之」,那是自私自利、将迎意必造成的拖累,并不是克治洗荡的祸患。如今说「养生以清心寡欲为要」,只「养生」两个字,便是自私自利、将迎意必的根。有这个病根潜伏心中,难怪有「灭于东而生于西」「引犬上堂而逐之」的毛病了。

Your letter says: 'Nourishing life takes a clear mind and scant desire as the essential. With clear mind and scant desire, the work of sage-making is complete. Yet desire scant, the mind clears of itself. Clearing the mind does not mean quitting human affairs to dwell alone seeking quiet; it means making this mind pure in heavenly principle without a hair of private desire. Now to do this work, mastering desire as it springs, leaves the root of sickness ever there — quenched in the east, sprouting in the west. To sweep the desires before they sprout leaves nowhere to apply strength and only muddies the mind. And to ferret out desires not yet sprouted in order to remove them is leading the dog into the hall and then chasing it out — worse still.'

To will this mind pure in heavenly principle without a hair of private desire is precisely the work of sage-making. And that cannot be done except by guarding before the sprouting and mastering at the moment of sprouting. Guarding before and mastering at the moment is exactly the Mean's vigilance and fear and the Learning's extension and investigation — beyond this there is no other work.

As for springing in the west when quenched in the east, leading the dog in and chasing it out — those are the encumbrances of self-serving, of forestalling and presuming, not faults of mastering and sweeping. To say nourishing life takes a clear mind and scant desire: the two words nourishing life are themselves the root of self-serving, forestalling and presuming. With that root lurking within, no wonder the quench-in-the-east, dog-in-the-hall troubles appear.

162

来书云:「佛氏于『不思善,不思恶时,认本来面目』,于吾儒『随物而格』之功不同。吾若于不思善、不思恶时,用致知之功,则已涉于思善矣。欲善恶不思,而心之良知清静自在,惟有寐而方醒之时耳。斯正孟子『夜气』之说。但于斯光景不能久,倏忽之际,思虑已生,不知用功久者,其常寐初醒而思未起之时否乎?今澄欲求宁静,愈不宁静,欲念无生,则念愈生。如之何而能使此心前念易减,后念不生,良知独显,而与造物者游乎?」

「不思善、不思恶时,认本来面目。」此佛氏为未识本来面目者设此方便。本来面目则吾圣门所谓良知,今既认得良知明白,即已不消如此说矣。

「随物而格」是致知之功,即佛氏之「常惺惺」,亦是常存他本来面目耳。体段工夫大略相似,但佛氏有个自私自利之心,所以便有不同耳。今欲善恶不思,而心之良知清静自在,此便有自私自利、将迎意必之心,所以有「不思善、不思恶时,用致知之功,则已涉于思善」之患。孟子说「夜气」,亦只是为失其良心之人指出个良心萌动处,使他从此培养将去。今已知得良知明白,常用致知之功,即已不消说「夜气」。却是得兔后不知守兔,而仍去守株,兔将复先之矣。欲求宁静,欲念无生,此正是自私自利、将迎意必之病,是以念愈生而愈不宁静。良知只是一个良知,而善恶自辨,更有何善何恶可思!良知之体本自宁静,今却又添一个求宁静;本自生生,今却又添一个欲无生,非独圣门致知之功不如此,虽佛氏之学亦未如此将迎意必也。只是一念良知,彻头彻尾,无始无终,即是前念不灭,后念不生。今却欲前念易灭,而后念不生,是佛氏所谓断灭种性,入于槁木死灰之谓矣。

来信说:「佛家讲『不思善不思恶时,认本来面目』,与我们儒家『随物而格』的功夫不同。我若在不思善不思恶时用致知的功夫,就已涉于思善了。要善恶不思而心的良知清静自在,只有刚睡醒的时候。这正是孟子『夜气』之说。但这种光景不能持久,倏忽之间思虑已生。不知用功久的人,是否常在这种初醒思虑未起之时?如今我想求宁静,越发不宁静;想念头不生,念头越发丛生。怎样才能使此心前念易灭、后念不生,良知独显,而与造物者同游呢?」

「不思善不思恶时认本来面目」,这是佛家为不认识本来面目的人设的方便。本来面目就是我们圣门所谓的良知,如今既已认得良知明白,就不须再这样说了。

「随物而格」是致知的功夫,就是佛家的「常惺惺」,也就是常存他的本来面目罢了。体段功夫大略相似,但佛家有个自私自利之心,所以便有不同。如今想善恶都不思而心的良知清静自在,这便有自私自利、将迎意必之心,所以有「不思善不思恶时用致知之功,便已涉于思善」的毛病。孟子讲「夜气」,也只是为丢失了良心的人指出个良心萌动的地方,让他从这里培养下去。如今已认得良知明白,常用致知的功夫,就已不须再说「夜气」。这是得了兔子却不知道守着兔子,仍然去守树桩,兔子要再跑掉了。求宁静、求念头无生,这正是自私自利、将迎意必的病,所以念头越生而越发不宁静。良知只是一个良知,而善恶自辨,还有什么善什么恶可思!良知之体本自宁静,如今却又添一个求宁静;本自生生,如今却又添一个欲无生。不但圣门致知的功夫不如此,就是佛家之学也没有这样将迎意必的。只是一念良知,彻头彻尾,无始无终,就是前念不灭、后念不生。如今却想前念易灭、后念不生,这就是佛家所谓「断灭种性」,落入槁木死灰了。

Your letter says: 'The Buddhists say: not thinking good, not thinking evil, know the original face — differing from our Confucian work of following things and correcting. If at the time of not-thinking-good-and-evil I apply the work of extension, I am already involved in thinking good. For good and evil unthought and innate knowledge clear and at ease, there is only the moment of waking from sleep — Mencius's night breath. But the scene does not last; in a flash thought is born. Do veterans of the work abide in that first waking, thought not yet risen? Now I seek stillness and grow less still; seek thoughts unborn and they teem the more. How make the former thoughts die easily, the later not arise, innate knowledge alone shining, roaming companion to the Creator?'

Not-thinking-good-and-evil to know the original face is the Buddhists' expedient for those who do not know their original face. The original face is what our school calls innate knowledge: once innate knowledge is clearly known, such talk is spent.

Following things and correcting is the work of extension — the Buddhists' ever-alert, ever-preserving their original face. The frame of the work is much alike; but the Buddhists carry a self-serving heart, and there lies the difference. To will good-and-evil unthought while innate knowledge rests clear is itself the self-serving, forestalling, presuming heart — hence the trouble that applying extension already thinks good. Mencius's night breath only pointed, for those who had lost the good mind, to where it stirs, that they might nurture it from there. Now that innate knowledge is clearly known and the work of extension constantly applied, night breath need no longer be spoken. It is having caught the hare yet leaving it to guard the stump — the hare will bolt again. Seeking stillness, seeking thoughts unborn: that very seeking is the disease of self-serving and presumption, hence thoughts teem the more and stillness recedes. Innate knowledge is one innate knowledge, itself discerning good and evil — what good and evil remain to think? Its substance is still of itself, and you add a seeking of stillness; quick with life of itself, and you add a willing of no-life. Not only does the school's work of extension not do so — even the Buddhists do not thus forestall and presume. One thought of innate knowledge, head to tail, without beginning or end, is former thoughts undying and later thoughts unborn. To will former thoughts easily dead and later unborn is the Buddhists' extinct seed-nature, withered wood and cold ashes.

163

来书云:「佛氏又有常提念头之说,其犹孟子所谓『必有事』,夫子所谓『致良知』之说乎?其即『常惺惺,常记得,常知得,常存得』者乎?于此念头提在之时,而事至物来,应之必有其道。但恐此念头提起时少,放下时多,则工夫间断耳。且念头放失,多因私欲客气[1]之动而始,忽然惊醒而后提,其放而未提之间,心之昏杂多不自觉,今欲曰精曰明,常提不放,以何道乎?只此常提不放,即全功乎?抑于常提不放之中,更宜加省克之功乎?虽曰常提不放,而不加戒惧克治之功,恐私欲不去;若加戒惧克治之功焉,又为『思善』之事,而于『本来面目』又未达一间也。如之何则可?」

戒惧克治即是常提不放之功,即是「必有事焉」,岂有两事邪!此节所问,前一段已自说得分晓,末后却是自生迷惑,说得支离。及有「本来面目未达一间」之疑,都是自私自利、将迎意必之为病,去此病,自无此疑矣。

来信说:「佛家又有常提念头的说法,岂不就像孟子所谓『必有事』、夫子所谓『致良知』?就是『常惺惺、常记得、常知得、常存得』吧?这念头提起之时,事至物来,应对必有它的道理。只怕这念头提起时少、放下时多,功夫便间断了。而且念头的放失,多因私欲客气的鼓动才开始,忽然惊醒后才重新提起;那放而未提之间,心的昏杂多不自知。如今想日精日明、常提不放,用什么方法?只此常提不放,就是全部功夫吗?还是在常提不放之中,更应加上省察克治的功夫?虽常提不放而不加戒惧克治,恐怕私欲不去;若加上戒惧克治,又成了『思善』之事,离『本来面目』又差一间了。怎样才好?」

戒惧克治就是常提不放的功夫,就是「必有事焉」,哪有两件事!此节所问,前一段已自说得分晓,末后却是自生迷惑,说得支离。至于有「本来面目未达一间」的疑问,都是自私自利、将迎意必造成的病,去掉这个病,自然没有这个疑问了。

Your letter says: 'The Buddhists also speak of ever-lifting the thought — is that not Mencius's always-having-the-task, your extension of innate knowledge? The ever-alert, ever-mindful, ever-knowing, ever-preserving? While the thought is lifted and affairs arrive, there must be a way to meet them. Only, the thought is lifted little and dropped much, and the work breaks off. The dropping mostly begins with the stir of private desire and temperamental energy; waking with a start, one lifts it again; in the gap between dropped and lifted, the mind's murk goes unremarked. To grow daily finer and brighter, ever lifted and undropped — by what way? Is this ever-lifting the whole work? Or within it should examination and mastery be added? Ever-lifted without vigilance and mastery, private desire will not go; with vigilance and mastery added, it becomes thinking-good, a room away from the original face. What is to be done?'

Vigilance and mastery are the work of ever-lifting, are the always-having-the-task — where are two things in it! The first half of your question was already answered clearly; the latter half spins confusion of itself, spoken in fragments. And the doubt of being a room away from the original face — all of it is the disease of self-serving, forestalling and presuming. Remove that disease and the doubt goes with it.

  1. 客气:指受外界影响而生之骄傲、名誉、情欲等。
164

来书云:「质美者明得尽,渣滓便浑化。如何谓[1]明得尽?如何而能便浑化?」

良知本来自明。气质不美者,渣滓多,障蔽厚,不易开明。质美者,渣滓原少,无多障蔽,略加致知之功,此良知便自莹彻,些少渣滓,如汤中浮雪,如何能作障蔽?此本不甚难晓,原静所以致疑于此,想是因一「明」字不[2]明白,亦是稍有欲速之心。向曾面论明善之义,明则诚矣,非若后儒所谓明善之浅也。

来信说:「『质美者明得尽,渣滓便浑化』。怎样叫明得尽?怎样便能浑化?」

良知本来自然明。气质不美的人,渣滓多、障蔽厚,不容易开明。质美的人,渣滓原本少,没有多少障蔽,略加致知的功夫,这良知便自晶莹透彻;些少渣滓,如同汤中的浮雪,怎么能构成障蔽?这本不难懂,原静之所以在此致疑,想是因为一个「明」字不明白,也稍有欲速之心。从前曾当面论过「明善」之义:明则诚矣,不是后世儒者所说的那种浅薄的明善。

Your letter says: 'Of fine endowment, when illumination is complete the dross melts wholly away. What is illumination complete? How does the dross wholly melt?'

Innate knowledge is bright of itself. The ill-endowed, dross-heavy and thickly veiled, are not easily opened. The finely endowed have little dross, thin veiling: touch them with the work of extension and innate knowledge flashes crystal-clear; the little dross is snow afloat on boiling soup — what screen can it make? This is not hard to see; your doubt here, I think, hangs on the single word bright, with a touch of the hunger for haste. We once discussed face to face the sense of understanding goodness: bright, then sincere — not the shallow understanding-goodness of later scholars.

  1. 「谓」字下,施本、俞本并有「之」字。
  2. 「不」字,施本、俞本并作「欠」。
165

来书云:「聪明睿知果质乎?仁义礼智果性乎?喜怒哀乐果情乎?私欲客气果一物乎?二物乎?古之其才,若子房、仲舒、叔度、孔明、文中、韩、范诸公[1],德业表著,皆良知中所发也,而不得谓之闻道者,果何在乎?苟曰此特生质之美耳,则生知、安行者,不愈于学知、困勉者乎[2]?愚意窃云谓诸公见道偏则可,谓全无闻则恐后儒崇尚记诵训诂之过也。然乎?否乎?」

性一而已。仁、义、礼、知,性之性[3]也;聪、明、睿、知,性之质也;喜、怒、哀、乐,性之情也;私欲、客气,性之蔽也。质有清浊,故情有过不及,而蔽有浅深也;私欲、客气,一病两痛,非二物也。张、黄、诸葛及韩、范诸公,皆天质之美,自多暗合道妙,虽未可尽谓之知学,尽谓之闻道,然亦自其有学,违道不远者也;使其闻学知道,即伊、傅、周、召[4]矣。若文中子则又不可谓之不知学者,其书虽多出于其徒,亦多有未是处,然其大略则亦居然可见,但今相去辽远,无有的然凭证,不可悬断其所至矣。夫良知即是道,良知之在人心,不但圣贸,虽常人亦无不如此。若无有物欲牵蔽,但循著真知发用流行将去,即无不是道。但在常人多为物欲牵蔽,不能循得良知。如数公者,天质既自清明,自少物欲为之牵蔽,则其良知之发用流行处,自然是多,自然违道不远。学者学循此良知而已。谓之知学,只是知得专在学循良知。数公虽未知专在良知上用功,而或泛滥于多歧,疑迷于影响,是以或离或合而未纯。若知得时,便是圣人矣。后儒尝以数子者,尚皆是气质用事,未免于行不著,习不察,此亦未为过论。但后儒之所谓著、察者,亦是狃于闻见之狭,蔽于沿习之非,而依拟仿象于影响形迹之间,尚非圣门之所谓著、察者也。则亦安得以己之昏昏,而求人之昭昭也乎?所谓生知、安行,「知、行」二字,亦是就用功上说;若是知、行本体,即是良知、良能,虽在困勉之人,亦皆可谓之生知、安行矣。知、行二字更宜精察。

来信说:「聪明睿智果真是天生的材质吗?仁义礼智果真是本性吗?喜怒哀乐果真是情吗?私欲客气是一件东西还是两件?古时的英才,如子房、仲舒、叔度、孔明、文中子、韩琦、范仲淹诸公,德业昭著,都是从良知中发出的,却不能称之为闻道者,究竟差在哪里?若说这只是天生资质之美,那么生知安行的人不就胜过学知困勉的人了吗?我私下以为,说诸公见道有偏差还可以,说他们全无所闻,恐怕是后儒崇尚记诵训诂造成的过失。对吗?」

性只是一个。仁义礼智是性之「性」,聪明睿智是性之「质」,喜怒哀乐是性之「情」,私欲客气是性之「蔽」。质有清浊,所以情有过不及,而蔽有浅深。私欲客气,是一种病两处痛,不是两件东西。张良、董仲舒、黄宪、诸葛亮以及韩琦、范仲淹诸公,都是天质之美,自然多与道妙暗合,虽不能全说他们知学、闻道,但也自然有他们的学问,离道不远;假使他们闻学知道,就是伊尹、傅说、周公、召公了。至于文中子,又不能说他不知学。他的书虽多出于弟子之手,也多有不对之处,但大略也显然可见;只是如今相去辽远,没有确凿的凭证,不可悬断他的造诣。良知就是道。良知之在人心,不但圣人,就是常人也无不如此。若没有物欲牵累遮蔽,只要循着良知发用流行下去,就没有不是道的。但常人多被物欲牵蔽,不能循得良知。像这几位,天质既自清明,从小很少有物欲牵蔽,那么他们良知发用流行之处自然就多,自然离道不远。学者学个循此良知而已。所谓知学,只是知道专在学循良知上下功夫。这几位虽不知专在良知上用功,有的泛滥于歧路,有的疑迷于影响,所以或离或合而不纯。若知道了,便是圣人了。后儒常说这几位尚都是气质用事,不免行而不著、习而不察,这也不为过论。但后儒所谓的「著察」,也是拘于见闻之狭、蔽于沿习之非,比拟仿像于影响形迹之间,还不是圣门所谓的著察。那又怎能拿自己的昏昏,去求别人的昭昭呢?所谓生知安行,「知行」二字也是就用功上说的;若是知行本体,就是良知良能,即使在困勉之人,也都可以叫生知安行了。「知行」二字更须精察。

Your letter says: 'Are intelligence and wisdom truly inborn endowment? Are humaneness, rightness, propriety, wisdom truly nature? Joy, anger, sorrow, pleasure — truly feeling? Are private desire and temperamental energy one thing or two? The great talents of old — Zhang Liang, Dong Zhongshu, Huang Xian, Zhuge Liang, Wang Tong, Han Qi, Fan Zhongyan — their virtue illustrious, all issuing from innate knowledge, yet not to be called hearers of the Way: where exactly do they fall short? If it is merely fineness of endowment, do the born-knowing surpass the learning-and-striving? I venture that to say their seeing of the Way was partial is fair; to say they wholly missed it is, I fear, the fault of later scholars' worship of recital and gloss. Is that so?'

Nature is one. Humaneness, rightness, propriety, wisdom are nature's nature; intelligence and wisdom, nature's endowment; joy, anger, sorrow, pleasure, nature's feelings; private desire and temperamental energy, nature's veil. Endowment is clear or turbid, hence feeling errs past or short and the veil lies thin or thick. Desire and temper are one sickness with two aches, not two things. Zhang Liang, Dong Zhongshu, Huang Xian, Zhuge Liang, Han Qi, Fan Zhongyan — all of finest natural endowment, much unconsciously according with the subtlety of the Way; one cannot wholly call them knowers of the learning or hearers of the Way, yet theirs was a learning of its own, not far from the Way; had they heard the learning and known the Way, they had been Yi Yin, Fu Yue, the Duke of Zhou, Duke Shao. As for Wang Tong, he can by no means be called ignorant of learning: his book, though largely from disciples' hands and often at fault, shows its broad outline plainly; only, the distance is now so great, with no certain proof, that his attainment cannot be judged from mid-air. Innate knowledge is the Way. In the human heart — not the sage's only, every person's without exception — were there no dragging veil of thing-desire, flowing simply along innate knowledge's working, nothing would not be the Way. But the many are dragged and veiled and cannot follow it. Men of such endowment, clear from birth, little veiled by desire — innate knowledge's working flows wide in them, and they stand not far from the Way. The learner learns to follow this innate knowledge; knowing the learning means knowing to work solely at following it. These men, not knowing to work solely at innate knowledge — some scattered among branching paths, some lost among shadows and echoes — were now apart, now conjoined, never pure. Had they known, they were sages. Later scholars say these men still acted from temperament, acting without penetration, practicing without awareness — no overstatement. But the later scholars' penetration and awareness, itself penned in narrow hearsay, veiled by inherited error, aping and miming among shadows and traces, is not the school's penetration and awareness. With one's own self dim, how demand brightness of others? As for born-knowing-acting-at-ease: the very words knowing and acting are said of applying effort; of the original substance of knowing and acting they are innate knowledge and innate ability — even in those who strive through hardship, all may be called born-knowing and acting-at-ease. The two words merit fine examination.

  1. 汉张良,董仲舒,黄宪,蜀诸葛亮,隋王通,宋韩琦,范仲淹。
  2. 「勉」字疑为「知」字之误,或以「学知」为「学利」之误。
  3. 「性之性」,王贻乐本作「性之德」。
  4. 伊尹:商朝贤相,助太甲建立功业。傅说:商朝贤相,助武丁建立功业。
166

来书云:「昔周茂叔每令伯淳寻仲尼、颜子乐处。敢问是乐也,与七情之乐同乎?否乎?若同,则常人之一遂所欲,皆能乐矣,何必圣贤?若别有真乐,则圣贤之遇大忧、大怒、大惊、大惧之事,此乐亦在否乎?且君子之心常存戒惧,是盖终身之忧也,恶得乐?澄平生多闷,未尝见真乐之趣,令切愿寻之。」

乐是心之本体,虽不同于七情之乐,而亦不外于七情之乐;虽则圣贤别有真乐,而亦常人之所同有,但常人有之而不自知,反自求许多忧苦,自加迷弃。虽在忧苦迷弃之中,而此乐又未尝不存,但一念开明,反身而诚,则即此而在矣。每与原静论,无非此意,而原静尚有「何道可得」之问,是犹未免于骑驴觅驴之蔽也。

来信说:「从前周茂叔常让程伯淳寻孔颜乐处。请问这个乐,与七情之乐相同吗?若相同,那么常人一遂所欲都能乐了,何必圣贤?若另有真乐,那么圣贤遇上大忧、大怒、大惊、大惧之事,这个乐还在吗?而且君子之心常存戒惧,这便是终身之忧,哪还能乐?我平生多苦闷,未尝见过真乐的趣味,现在切愿寻得它。」

乐是心的本体。虽不同于七情之乐,而也不外于七情之乐;圣贤虽别有真乐,而也是常人所同有的,只是常人有之而不自知,反而自寻许多忧苦,自己加以迷弃。即使在忧苦迷弃之中,这个乐也未尝不存在,只要一念开明,反身而诚,那么它就在眼前了。每次与原静讨论,无非这个意思,而原静还有「何道可得」之问,这就未免还是有骑驴觅驴的蒙蔽了。

Your letter says: 'Zhou Maoshu used to set Bochun to seek where Confucius and Yan Hui found joy. Is that joy the same as the joy of the seven feelings? If the same, then any common man gratified would know it — why need sages? If a true joy apart, does it survive the sage's meetings with great grief, great anger, great alarm, great fear? And the noble heart ever vigilant — that is lifelong anxiety: where is joy in it? My life has been mostly gloom; I have never tasted true joy, and now I earnestly seek it.'

Joy is the mind's original substance. Unlike the joy of the seven feelings, it is yet not outside them; though sages have a true joy of their own, it is what all people commonly have — only, having it, they do not know it, and instead heap themselves woe and seek it afar, burying and forsaking it. Even amid woe and self-forsaking, this joy never fails to be there: one thought opening bright, turning back on oneself in sincerity — and it is at hand. Every discussion with you, Yuanjing, has been just this; and still you ask by what way it may be had — the veil of riding an ass while searching for an ass.

167

来书云:「《大学》以『心有好乐、忿懥、忧患、恐惧』为『不得其正』,而程子亦谓『圣人情顺万事而无情』。所谓有者,《传习录》中以病疟譬之,极精切矣。若程子之言,则是圣人之情不生于心而生于物也,何谓邪?且事感而情应,则是是非非可以就格;事或未感时,谓之有则未形也,谓之无则病根在有无之间,何以致吾知乎?学务无情,累虽轻,而出儒入佛矣,可乎?」

圣人致知之功,至诚无息。其良知之体,皦如明镜,略无纤翳,妍媸之来,随物见形,而明镜曾无留染,所谓「情顺万事而无情」也。「无所所住而生其心」,佛氏曾有是言,未为非也。明镜之应物,妍者妍,媸者媸,一照而皆真,即是生其心处,妍者妍,媸者媸,一过而不留,即是无所住处。病疟之喻,既已见其精切,则此节所问可以释然。病疟之人,疟虽未发,而病根自在,则亦安可以其疟之未发而遂忘其服药调理之功乎?若必待疟发而后服药调理,则既晚矣。致知之功,无间于有事、无事,而岂论于病之已发、未发邪?大抵原静所疑,前后虽若不一,然皆起于自私自利、将迎意必之为崇,此根一去,则前后所疑,自将冰消雾释,有不待于问辨者矣。

钱德洪跋:答原静书出,读者皆喜澄善问,师善答,皆得闻所未闻。师曰:「原静所问只是知解上转,不得已与之逐节分疏。若信得良知,只在良知上用工,虽千经万典无不脗合,异端曲学一勘尽破矣。何必如此节节分解!佛家有『扑人逐块』之喻,见块扑人,则得人矣,见块逐块,于块奚得哉?」在座诸友闻之,惕然皆有惺悟。此学贵反求,非知解可入也。[1]

来信说:「《大学》把『心有好乐、忿懥、忧患、恐惧』看作『不得其正』,而程子也说『圣人情顺万事而无情』。所谓『有』,《传习录》中用病疟作比喻,已极精切。至于程子的话,那圣人之情便不是生于心而是生于物了,这是什么道理?而且事情感召而情应,是是非非可以就事格正;事情未来时,说有则未成形,说无则病根在有无之间,怎样致我的知呢?为学务求无情,牵累虽轻,却出入于儒佛之间了,可以吗?」

圣人致知的功夫,至诚无息。其良知之体皎如明镜,没有丝毫云翳,美丑之来,随物见形,而明镜不曾有滞留沾染,这就是所谓「情顺万事而无情」。「无所住而生其心」,佛家曾有这话,不算错。明镜照物,美的照出美,丑的照出丑,一照皆真,这就是「生其心」处;美的自美,丑的自丑,一过而不留,这就是「无所住」处。病疟的比喻既已见其精切,此节所问可以释然了。病疟之人,疟虽未发,而病根自在,怎能因为疟未发作,就忘了服药调理的功夫呢?若必待疟发而后服药调理,就晚了。致知的功夫,不分有事无事,哪里论病之已发未发呢?大抵原静所疑,前后虽似不同,都起于自私自利、将迎意必在作祟。这个根一去,前后所疑,自将冰消雾释,不待问辨了。

钱德洪跋:答原静书一出,读者都称道原静善问、老师善答,都听到了前所未闻的道理。老师说:「原静所问,只是在知解上打转,我不得已才逐节分疏。若信得良知,只在良知上用功,那么即使千经万典无不吻合,异端曲学一勘便破,何必这样节节分解!佛家有『扑人逐块』的比喻:见狗咬人便打狗,就得其人了;见狗追石块便追石块,对石块又能怎么样呢?」在座诸友听了,惕然都有醒悟。这门学问贵在反求,不是知解所能进入的。

Your letter says: 'The Great Learning counts fondness, anger, anxiety and fear in the heart as loss of rectitude, and Chengzi too says the sage's feelings follow the myriad affairs yet are no feelings. Of the having, your Record's malaria figure is exact and fine. But Chengzi's words make the sage's feelings born not of the mind but of things — how so? When affairs stir and feeling answers, right and wrong can be set right in the affair; but before affairs stir, to say the feelings are there — nothing yet formed; to say not there — the root hovers between being and non-being: how then extend my knowledge? To strive for feeling-lessness lightens the burden but crosses out of Confucianism into Buddhism — is that permissible?'

The sage's work of extension is utmost sincerity unceasing. His innate knowledge's substance is bright as a mirror without a film: beauty and ugliness coming take shape as they are, and the mirror keeps no stain — feelings following the myriad affairs, yet none clung to. Arousing the mind while dwelling nowhere — the Buddhists said it, and not wrongly. The mirror mirroring things: the fair fair, the foul foul, one gleam all true — there is the arousing of the mind; the fair fair, the foul foul, passing and not staying — there is the dwelling nowhere. The malaria figure having served so well, this question too may rest. The malaria sufferer between fits still carries the root: can he, because the fit is quiet, forget the medicine and regimen? To wait for the fit before dosing is too late. The work of extension knows no with-affairs or without — where would it discuss the illness broken out or not? Your doubts, Yuanjing, various as they seem, all arise from the haunting of self-serving, forestalling and presumption: root that out and the doubts melt like ice and lift like fog, with no need of question and answer.

Qian Dehong's postscript: When the reply to Yuanjing appeared, readers all praised Yuanjing's questioning and the master's answering — hearing what they had never heard. The master said: 'Yuanjing's questions only turn on intellectual construction; I perforce untangled them section by section. Trust innate knowledge, work at it alone, and the thousand classics and ten thousand canons all accord — one probe and heterodoxy and twisted learning shatter. Why such section-by-section analysis! The Buddhists have the figure of the dog that bites men: strike the dog that bites and you have the thing itself; chase the stone it chases, and what have you gained of the stone?' All friends present started into wakefulness. This learning prizes turning back to seek within; intellection cannot enter it.

  1. 此段系钱德洪按语。
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